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GPS Tracking at the Border:  A Mistaken 
Expectation or A Chilling Reality 
Kimberly Shi∆* 
Abstract 
In 2018, Matthew C. Allen, the Assistant Director for the 
Domestic Operations Division within the United States Department 
of Homeland Security, filed a declaration in United States v. 
Ignjatov describing a departmental policy allowing for the 
installation of a “GPS tracking device on a vehicle at the United 
States border without a warrant or individualized suspicion,” 
limited “to 48 hours.” While the Border Search Doctrine, which 
predates the Fourth Amendment, deems that no warrant is 
necessary at the border for most searches and seizures because of 
the government’s inherent power to control who or what comes 
within a nation’s borders, the Fourth Amendment protects the 
“right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” This Note 
examines the implications of the installation of a Global 
Positioning Services (GPS) tracking device at the border without a 
warrant and whether the installation and tracking thereafter 
should be considered a constitutional exception under the Border 
Search Doctrine, unconstitutional based on Fourth Amendment 
precedent, or both. This Note highlights the tension between 
“classic” Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and the Border Search 
Doctrine as a result of technological advancement, and determines 
based on current policies and precedent, such as United States v. 
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Jones and Carpenter v. United States, that the installation of a 
GPS tracking device is a search under the Fourth Amendment and 
not subject to the Border Search Doctrine exception. This Note then 
concludes by advocating for greater policy transparency in 
congruence with established precedent in order to ensure the 
privacy rights of both citizens and noncitizens alike moving 
forward. 
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I. Introduction 
In 2017, border patrol agents attached two GPS tracking 
devices to a truck and trailer crossing the U.S. border.1 Acting 
without a warrant, federal agents tracked the vehicles on their 
computers for the next thirty-three hours as the truck made its 
way to Los Angeles.2 Law enforcement utilized electronic 
surveillance until the defendants drove from San Bernardino 
County to Los Angeles County.3 Then, a combination of physical 
surveillance and electronic monitoring began.4 After more than 
twenty-one hours of surveillance, a Los Angeles Police Department 
(LAPD) officer witnessed the defendants get out of the vehicle and 
meet an unknown man.5 The unknown man retrieved a small 
duffle bag and handed it to one of the defendants before both 
parties departed.6 The officers believed that the defendants were 
key individuals in a drug trafficking organization and that the 
duffle bag contained cocaine.7 Yet when the officers approached the 
defendants and detained them on suspicion of possession of a 
controlled substance with an intent to transport, they only found 
 
 1.  See Complaint for Injunctive Relief at 1, Elec. Frontier Found. v. Dep’t 
of Homeland Sec., No. 1:19-cv-02578 (D.C.C. Aug. 27, 2019), ECF No. 1 
[hereinafter EFF Complaint] (laying out the facts from United States v. Ignjatov, 
No. 5:17-cr-00222-JGB (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2017), ECF No. 1 and the failed 
attempts by the Electronic Frontier Foundation in filing FOIA requests to CBP 
and ICE for information regarding GPS policies at the border). 
 2.  See Complaint at 13–19, United States v. Ignjatov, No. 5:17-cr-00222-
JGB (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2017), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter Ignjatov Complaint] 
(documenting email exchanges between LAPD officials and FBI agents and 
revolving around tailing the vehicle). 
 3.  See id. (discussing how border agents believed the warrantless 
installation at the border to be valid). 
 4.  See id. (describing how Agent Asatur and Agent Monroe assisted in the 
surveillance both before and at the time of arrest). 
 5.  See Declaration of Asatur Mkrtchyan at 3–4, United States v. Ignjatov, 
No. 5:17-cr-00222-JGB (C.D. Cal. May 21, 2018), ECF No. 87-2 [hereinafter 
Asatur Declaration] (outlining his knowledge and facts of the case as well as his 
experience as a police officer for the LAPD). 
 6.  See id. at 2 (describing how law enforcement officers seized ten duffle 
bags of cocaine from another Bo-Mak semi-truck driven by “Karac” after officers 
saw him receive the bags from a co-conspirator). 
 7.  See id. at 3–4 (explaining how the agents utilized the location data to 
intercept the Bo-Mak truck and proceeded to tail it). 
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fifteen four-pound packages of sugar in the duffle bag.8 Federal 
agents released the defendants following the search but later 
arrested the defendants as they attempted to leave the United 
States for Canada in Port Huron, Michigan for conspiracy to traffic 
cocaine.9 This was eight days after the initial installation of the 
tracking device.10  
Ruling consistently with United States v. Jones,11 the district 
court found the “[s]urreptitious surveillance of an individual’s 
movement through placement of a GPS device on a vehicle [to] 
implicate[] far greater privacy concerns than the physical integrity 
of the vehicle.”12 The combination of the installation with the 
“subsequent tracking of data over a prolonged period away” from 
the border could not be justified under the border search 
exception.13 The court then suppressed all of the evidence garnered 
from the physical and electronic surveillance of the defendants.14 
 
 8.  See id. (explaining that Ignjatov and the other defendant consented to 
the search at this time).  
 9.  See Ignjatov Complaint, supra note 2, at 19 (outlining the drug 
trafficking investigation and the reasonable suspicion for the arrest based on 
Hannah Monroe’s declaration); see also Declaration of Hannah Monroe at 7–8, 
United States v. Ignjatov, No. 5:17-cr-00222-JGB (C.D. Cal. May 21, 2018), ECF 
No. 87-1 [hereinafter Monroe Declaration] (describing in detail the arrest and 
surveillance measures used after the installation of the GPS device).  
 10.  See Declaration of Steven Gruel at 9, United States v. Ignjatov, No. 5:17-
cr-00222-JGB (C.D. Cal. June 18, 2018), ECF No. 95 [hereinafter Gruel 
Declaration] (noting how the use of GPS tracking devices encompassed from the 
time of installation on October 20, 2017 till the defendants’ arrest on October 28, 
2017, meaning that “law enforcement tracked the defendants across the country 
over thousands of miles continuously for over eight days primarily only using the 
GPS monitoring device”). 
 11.  See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402–03 (2012) (holding that the 
installation of a GPS tracking device without a warrant violated the Fourth 
Amendment).  
 12.  See Am. Order Granting Defendants’ Mot. to Suppress at 7, United 
States v. Ignjatov, No. 5:17-cr-00222-JGB (C.D. Cal Oct. 10, 2018), ECF No. 132 
[hereinafter Amended Order] (granting the defendants’ motion to suppress 
evidence after considering the oral argument and the papers filed both in support 
of, and in opposition to, the motion). 
 13.  See id. at 7–8 (analyzing the instillation under the Border Search and 
Extended Border Search doctrine). 
 14.  See id. at 15 (concluding that the defendants’ motion to suppress should 
be granted). 
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This case, United States v. Ignjatov,15 revealed an unknown 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) policy to the general public.16 According to a 
declaration from Assistant Director Matthew C. Allen, Homeland 
Security’s policy (DHS GPS Policy) allows for the installation of a 
“GPS tracking device on a vehicle at the United States border 
without a warrant or individualized suspicion.”17 Because the 
warrantless tracking and monitoring policy is “limit[ed] [to] 
warrantless GPS monitoring to 48 hours,” DHS deemed it 
acceptable because individuals have “a significantly reduced 
expectation of privacy in the location of their vehicles” at the 
border.18 This forty-eight hour rule also purportedly “did not apply 
to commercial vehicles like semi-trucks whatsoever,” for according 
to Assistant Director Allen, “a significantly reduced expectation of 
privacy in the location of [these] vehicles appl[ies].”19 
To date, DHS and CBP refuse to provide further explanation 
and insight into this DHS GPS Policy.20 The Electronic Frontier 
Foundation (EFF) filed suit against DHS after DHS denied EFF’s 
FOIA request.21 EFF hopes to shed more light on this policy, but 
 
 15.  United States v. Ignjatov, No. 5:17-cr-00222-JGB (C.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 
2018), ECF No. 134 (granting government’s motion to dismiss the case as to 
Slavco Ignjatov). 
 16.  See Gruel Declaration, supra note 10, at 2–4, 8–10 (explaining how this 
48-hour policy is unheard of but the agents acted based on this knowledge and 
assumption).  
 17.  See Declaration of Assistant Director Matthew C. Allen at 2–3, United 
States v. Ignjatov, No. 5:17-cr-00222-JGB (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2018), ECF No. 125 
[hereinafter Allen Declaration] (providing a formal statement as the “Assistant 
Director for the Domestic Operations Division within the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) . . . U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s 
(ICE) Homeland Security Investigations (HSI)”). 
 18.  See id. (providing no other explanation regarding the authority behind 
the policy or when it came into fruition).  
 19.  See Gruel Declaration, supra note 10, at 2 (noting that according to 
agents Gernatt and Abair “warrantless GPS installation was permitted as long 
as monitoring did not exceed 48 hours . . . [and] this ‘48 rule’ did not apply to 
commercial vehicles like semi-trucks whatsoever”); Allen Declaration, supra note 
17, at 1–3.  
 20.  See Ignjatov Complaint, supra note 2, at 1–6 (denying and refusing to 
respond to EFF’s FOIA request). 
 21.  See id. (laying out the requests EFF made to CBP and ICE regarding 
these policies).  
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the suit is ongoing.22 The ambiguity of this policy is problematic 
because it highlights a juncture between Supreme Court precedent 
and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that could potentially 
implicate significant privacy concerns for both citizens and 
noncitizens alike.23 
The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.”24 This protection is not 
limited to merely an intrusion on property.25 Instead, it protects a 
person’s “reasonable expectation of privacy” that society also 
recognizes as reasonable.26 Warrants are therefore necessary in 
almost all instances for a valid search to occur.27 The Border 
Search Doctrine, however, is one of the few exceptions to this 
general rule.28 
 
 22.  See Order, Elec. Frontier Found. v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:19-cv-
02578 (D.C.C. Aug. 6, 2020), ECF No. 15 [hereinafter EFF Order] (setting 
deadlines for plaintiff and defendant’s motions for summary judgment).  
 23.  See id. (challenging the withholding of information that could potentially 
result in “circumvention of the law”). 
 24.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 25.  See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (deciding that the 
Fourth Amendment protects people rather than places); see also United States v. 
Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 414 (2012) (identifying that a physical intrusion for the 
purpose of seeking information is considered a search under the Fourth 
Amendment). 
 26.  See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361–62 (Harlan, J., concurring) (creating a two part 
test requiring a subjective component, where the court evaluates whether the 
individual had a reasonable expectation of privacy, and an objective component, 
where the court evaluates whether the expectation is one that society recognizes 
as reasonable); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 735 (1979) (determining 
that the installation of a pen register by law enforcement to not be a search within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because consumers could be aware of an 
assumption of risk).  
 27. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 381–83 (2014) (holding that police 
must obtain a warrant before searching a cell phone incident to arrest and a 
warrantless search to be unconstitutional); see also Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 
(mentioning how warrantless searches are typically unlawful “subject only to a 
few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions”).  
 28. See YULE KIM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31826, PROTECTING THE U.S. 
PERIMETER:  BORDER SEARCHES UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, 6–19 (2009) 
[hereinafter KIM, PROTECTING THE U.S. PERIMETER] (addressing the scope of 
government’s constitutional authority at the border); see United States v. 
Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977) (discussing how the Fourth Amendment’s 
power came from deterrence and security efforts). 
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The Border Search Doctrine predates the Fourth Amendment 
and derives its powers from Congress’s inherent authority to 
regulate commerce and enforce immigration laws.29 No warrant is 
necessary at the border for most searches and seizures because of 
the government’s inherent power to control who or what comes 
within a nation’s borders.30 This is an intrinsic attribute of 
national sovereignty.31 The Fourth Amendment’s balance of 
interests thus leans heavily in favor of the government at the 
border.32 Even though courts favor government interests at the 
border, searches and seizures must remain “reasonable” 
dependent on the facts and circumstances in question.33  
While the Border Search Doctrine falls under one of the 
warrantless exceptions of the Fourth Amendment, the scope of 
authority remains hazy in application and is up to the 
interpretation of law enforcement and courts around the country, 
posing problematic inconsistencies.34 This Note specifically focuses 
 
 29. See 19 U.S.C. § 482 (2002) (establishing “officers or persons authorized 
to board or search vessels may stop, search, and examine . . . any vehicle, beast, 
or person”); see also 19 U.S.C. § 1582 (1930) (discussing the Tariff Act of 1930 and 
outlining the ability of the Secretary of Treasury to prescribe regulations to the 
search of persons and baggage); see also Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 619 (detailing how 
the border search exception has a history as old as the Fourth Amendment, and 
the broad powers originally granted was to regulate “Commerce with foreign 
Nations’” and to “prevent smuggling” and “prohibited articles from entry”).  
 30.  See Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 619 (elaborating on the broad powers granted 
by Congress).  
 31. See id. at 616 (providing explicit examples from the state legislatures on 
Sept. 25, 1789 and the Act of July 31, 1789 to show that there is an 
“acknowledgement of plenary customs power” which is “differentiated from the 
more limited power to enter and search” a particular place, where a warrant is 
required).  
 32.  See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985) 
(dictating that “[s]ince the founding of our Republic . . . [Congress has] granted 
the Executive plenary authority to conduct routine searches and seizures at the 
border, without probable cause or a warrant”). 
 33.  See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 267–76 (1973) 
(determining that the search of the petitioner’s automobile by a roving patrol at 
least twenty miles north of the Mexican border was unreasonable due to an 
absence of probable cause or consent).  
 34.  See Allen Declaration, supra note 17, at 2–3 (revealing through a 
declaration from a Homeland Security official that it was a known policy for DHS 
to be allowed to install a warrantless tracking device as long as it was for less 
than 48 hours upon entry into the United States); see also J. Alan Bock, 
Annotation, Validity of border searches & seizures by customs officers, 6 A.L.R. 
Fed. 317 (1971) (providing an analysis of the different positions circuits have 
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on whether the use of a Global Positioning Services (GPS) tracking 
device at the border without a warrant should fall under the 
Border Search Doctrine, or if it should fall in line with United 
States v. Jones,35 in which the Supreme Court held unanimously 
that it was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment to use 
a GPS tracking device without a warrant to monitor and gather 
information on an individual.36 
Part II provides background on the Fourth Amendment and 
the Border Search Doctrine, while discussing the rationales for its 
expansion over the years.37 It highlights the difficulties in 
differentiating between warrantless searches of automobiles to 
other items, such as electronic devices.38 Part III discusses United 
States v. Ignjatov to highlight the tension between “classic” Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence and the Border Search Doctrine, while 
discussing the ramifications of the policy guidelines revealed.39 
Part IV analyzes whether the installation of a GPS tracking device 
should fall under “classic” Fourth Amendment protections, the 
Border Search Doctrine, or both.40 Part V offers reasons for why 
such an inconsistency between policy and precedent is detrimental 
to privacy concerns and advocates the position that policy 
transparency in congruence with established precedent is 
necessary to ensure that the privacy rights of both citizens and 
noncitizens in the United States remain intact.41 
II. Background 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has evolved with 
advancements in technology.42 This evolution results in 
 
taken in regard to searches and seizures). 
 35.  United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 401 (2012). 
 36.  See id. at 401, 408–11 (concluding that the common-law trespass doctrine 
applied to the case rather than Katz’s reasonable expectations test). 
 37.  See discussion infra Sections II.A.–B.  
 38.  See discussion infra Part II. 
 39.  See discussion infra Sections III.A–B.  
 40.  See discussion infra Sections IV.A–B. 
 41.  See discussion infra Part V. 
 42.  See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies:  
Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 805 (2004) 
(discussing how courts “must update and redefine the Fourth Amendment as 
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complications in applying existing Fourth Amendment doctrines 
here and a greater chance of the deterioration of individual 
privacy.43 This section summarizes the development and use of the 
reasonable expectation test in the Fourth Amendment context. It 
highlights its application in regard to tracking on public roadways 
to the ultimate tracking of the vehicle itself. This section also 
highlights special considerations courts analyze in circumstances 
where the level of intrusiveness heightens privacy concerns. 
A. The Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from 
unreasonable government searches and seizures.44 Seizures can be 
split into two categories.45 A seizure of property is “some 
meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests 
in that property.”46 In contrast, seizure of an individual occurs 
when an individual reasonably believes that he or she is not at 
liberty to leave a government official’s presence, given all of the 
circumstances surrounding the incident.47 Courts balance these 
elements to determine whether the government action was 
reasonable.48  
 
technology evolves).  
 43.  See Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 197–202 (1993) (deliberating the conception of “a man’s 
home is his castle” in the Fourth Amendment context).  
 44.  See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (declaring the right of the people to “be secure 
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects . . . .”). 
 45.  See infra notes 46–47 and accompanying text (describing different 
circumstances where Courts evaluate what constitutes a “search” under the 
Fourth Amendment).  
 46.  See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (holding that the 
removal of a tube from a box, after federal agents observed a white powdery 
substance, did not constitute as a search under the Fourth Amendment because 
no reasonable expectation was expected).  
 47.  See Sodal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992) (finding the 
dispossession of mobile homeowners of their mobile home by deputy sheriffs to be 
a “seizure” within the Fourth Amendment because the home was literally carried 
away).  
 48.  See KIM, PROTECTING THE U.S. PERIMETER, supra note 28 (explaining that 
reasonableness is determined by “balancing the governmental interest justifying 
the intrusion against a person’s legitimate expectation of privacy”). 
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In contrast, warrantless searches under the Fourth 
Amendment are typically per se unreasonable.49 The Supreme 
Court decided in Katz v. United States50 that the attachment of an 
eavesdropping device outside of a public phone booth constituted 
an unreasonable search.51 By listening and recording the 
petitioner’s words, the government “violated the privacy on which 
[the petitioner] justifiably relied” and thus constituted a search 
and seizure under the Fourth Amendment.52 Justice Harlan’s 
concurrence developed a two-prong test to determine whether a 
search occurred.53 If an individual has a subjective expectation of 
privacy over the domain in question and society objectively 
recognizes that expectation as reasonable, then the search is 
unconstitutional unless law enforcement acquired a warrant or 
one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement applies.54 This is 
because “[t]he Fourth Amendment [] protects people and not 
places.”55 Courts now apply this “reasonable expectation” of 
privacy test in Fourth Amendment cases.56 
As technology advanced, Courts faced a new challenge in 
determining searches in the public and private domain. In United 
 
 49.  See id. (describing how violations of the Fourth Amendment occur when 
the government fails to justify the intrusion of a person’s privacy expectations).  
 50.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (holding that the 
Government’s use of an electronic listening device constituted a search under the 
Fourth Amendment).  
 51.  See id. at 355–57 (explaining that Fourth Amendment protections should 
not be based on the “presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given 
enclosure” and that a new test would replace the test for privacy due to 
technological advancement).  
 52.  See id. at 353 (finding that the “fact that the electronic device . . . did not 
penetrate the wall of the booth” to have no “constitutional significance”).  
 53.  See id. at 360–62 (Harlan, J., concurring) (agreeing with the majority 
opinion “that an enclosed telephone booth is an area” like a home but there should 
be a subjective and objective test as to whether there is an expectation of privacy). 
 54.  See id. (developing the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test requiring 
both a subjective and objective component). 
 55.  See id. at 351 (majority opinion) (describing how even if an individual 
discloses information in public, if it is a disclosure he reasonably hopes to keep 
private, then it remains constitutionally protected). 
 56.  See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983) (finding no 
violation with the installation); see also United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 706 
(1984) (concluding no violation under the Katz test occurred for there was no 
violation to an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy). 
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States v. Knotts,57 the Supreme Court concluded that the 
surveillance, tracking, and following of an individual traveling on 
a public roadway did not constitute as a search or seizure.58 The 
“beeper” placed inside the chloroform container was a radio 
transmitter, which transmitted beeper signals to a monitor held by 
law enforcement.59 Law enforcement obtained consent from the 
original owner prior to the installation of the beeper for tracking 
purposes; however, officials failed to obtain a warrant prior to 
using the beeper to monitor Knotts.60 The Court, however, 
concluded that no reasonable expectation of privacy exists on 
public roadways because of the ability of any individual to survey 
those movements freely.61 While it did not apply to the case before 
the Court, Justice Brennan’s concurrence clarified the Supreme 
Court’s statement in Katz regarding “[t]he Fourth Amendment [] 
protect[ing] people and not places,” by explaining that “when the 
Government does engage in [the] physical intrusion of a 
constitutionally protected area to obtain information, that 
intrusion may constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment.”62 
The Court also left open the question of the duration of government 
 
 57.  See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 276 (becoming one of the most important 
electronic monitoring cases in Fourth Amendment precedent). 
 58.  See id. at 276–77 (holding that even though the officers did not only rely 
on visual surveillance, the use of a beeper did not change the fact that the Fourth 
Amendment does not prohibit law enforcement from “augmenting their sensory 
faculties” and the beeper did not change what “would not have been visible to the 
naked eye from outside the cabin”).  
 59.  See id. at 276 (determining no violation of privacy even with the beeper 
because the vehicle traveled on public roadways). 
 60.  See id. at 277–81 (noting that the record did “not reveal that the beeper 
was used after the location in the area of the cabin had been initially determined” 
by a combination of physical and electronic surveillance). 
 61.  See id. at 276 (reasoning that there is no reasonable expectation of 
privacy for individual’s traveling on public roads because of the ability to observe 
their movements freely, even though a radio transmitter was placed into a drum 
purchased by one of the codefendants). 
 62.  See id. at 286 (Brennan, J., concurring) (describing how Katz did not 
erode the principle of the Fourth Amendment affording protections to property 
and explaining how the case would have been a much more difficult one to decide 
if the respondent had challenged the original installation of the beeper rather 
than “merely certain aspects of the monitoring of the beeper installed in the 
chloroform container purchased by respondent’s compatriot”).  
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surveillance required for Fourth Amendment protections to apply, 
leaving it to be dealt with in the future.63 
Similarly, the Supreme Court in United States v. Karo64 held 
that the warrantless use of an electronic monitor within a 
container was reasonable and did not infringe on Karo’s interests 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.65 The Court 
concluded that the use of the beeper did not trigger Fourth 
Amendment protections because the beeper merely led law 
enforcement agents to the storage facility without identifying the 
specific locker, which was identified only by the smell of ether 
emanating therefrom.66 Similar to Knotts, the Court maintained 
that no reasonable expectation of privacy exists on public 
roadways.67 Therefore, as long as an individual is visible and 
traversing on public streets, then a lower expectation of privacy 
exists.68  
 
 63.  See id. at 283–84 (majority opinion) (discussing how the Respondent 
“expresses the generalized view that the result of the holding sought by the 
government would be that ‘twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen of this 
country will be possible, without judicial knowledge or supervision,” but “if such 
dragnet type of law enforcement practices as a respondent envisions should 
eventually occur, there will be time enough then to determine whether different 
constitutional principles may be applicable”). 
 64.  United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 706 (1984). 
 65.  See id. at 706–07 (finding that the “informant’s consent was sufficient to 
validate the installation,” and any transfer thereafter was not a search or seizure 
since no conveyance of information of private information occurred and possessory 
interests were not interfered with in any meaningful way).  
 66.  See id. (determining that the use of the beeper to locate the storage 
facility did not amount to an illegal search but acknowledging that there is a 
reasonable expectation of privacy from being monitored within the privacy of 
one’s home).  
 67.  See id. (deciding that the use of the beeper to locate the storage facility 
did not equate to an illegal search because “the ether was seen being loaded into 
[the] truck, which then traveled the highways”). 
 68.  See id. at 712–13 (discussing how the only privacy interests infringed 
were due to the occasional monitoring of the beeper which did not constitute a 
violation of Fourth Amendment protections and similarly, even though the can 
“may have contained an unknown and unwanted foreign object,” there was no 
intrusion on possessory interest in a meaningful way and at most, it “was a 
technical trespass on the space occupied by the beeper”). The Supreme Court 
established an automobile exception to the warrant requirement in Caroll v. 
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 134–36, 153 (1925), but because this Note focuses on 
tracking rather than the flexibility of law enforcement in the vehicle context, no 
further discussion on this exception follows.  
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The Supreme Court in United States v. Jones held that law 
enforcement committed a search by attaching a GPS tracking 
device to a vehicle.69 The Court came to this result even though the 
device was utilized to monitor the individual on public streets.70 
The Court decided that it “need not address the Government’s 
contention that Jones had no ‘reasonable expectation of privacy,’ 
because Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights [did] not rise or fall 
with the Katz formulation.”71  
The Court focused instead on the idea of intrusion.72 The Jones 
Court differentiated Jones from Karo and Knotts because in Jones, 
the Government “trespassorily inserted the information-gathering 
device” onto the private property of an individual.73 Since the 
Government “physically occupied private property for the purpose 
of obtaining information,” the encroachment and intrusion on a 
protected area constituted a search under the Fourth 
Amendment.74 The Court, moreover, expressly distinguished Karo 
from Jones because in Karo, law enforcement acquired the consent 
of the original owner prior to the beeper being placed in the 
container to track the vehicle.75 The beeper device consequently did 
not constitute a trespass or intrusion.76 Jones treated the 
installation of the GPS and its use to track a vehicle as a singular 
 
 69.  See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 401–03 (2012) (affirming the 
lower court’s decision after hearing about how law enforcement attached a GPS 
tracking device to the car of the defendant’s wife in Maryland on the eleventh day 
and tracked it for 28 days, after obtaining a warrant authorizing the “installation 
of the device in the District of Columbia [] within 10 days”). 
 70.  See id. at 401, 409 (explaining how “the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-
privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory 
test” and that since Jones “possessed the Jeep at the time the Government 
trespassorily inserted the information-gathering device” it is differentiated from 
Knotts and Karo). 
 71.  See id. (determining that because the government intruded on privacy 
interests, which is a search under the Fourth Amendment, that there was no need 
to also apply Katz).  
 72.  See id. at 406–12 (utilizing common-law trespass rather than Katz’s 
expectations test).  
 73.  See id. at 408–11 (discussing how Katz did not replace the common-law 
of trespass).  
 74.  Id. at 404–05, 411–12. 
 75.  See id. at 409 (discussing how the transfer of the container with the 
beeper “did not convey any information and thus did not invade Karo’s privacy”). 
 76.  See id. (determining that because Karo accepted the beeper, he was “not 
entitled to object to the beeper’s presence”).  
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act that constitutes a search.77 This reasoning echoed Justice 
Brennan’s concurrence regarding Katz in United States v. Knotts.78 
The majority in Jones held that “the Katz 
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test [] added to, not substituted 
for, the common-law trespassory test.”79 The majority found a 
strict application of Katz to pose greater issues and problematic 
inconsistencies.80 In contrast, the concurrences hoped for a stricter 
application.81 Justice Alito’s concurrence slightly diverged from the 
majority by focusing more on interest balancing.82 Utilizing Knotts, 
Justice Alito asserted that “relatively short-term monitoring of a 
person’s movements on public streets accords with expectations of 
privacy that our society has recognized as reasonable.”83 However, 
“the use of longer term GPS monitoring in 
investigations . . . impinges on expectation of privacy.”84 Justice 
Alito concluded that the Court “need not identify with precision the 
point at which the tracking of this vehicle became a search, for the 
line was surely crossed before the 4-week mark.”85 Based on this 
analysis, an individual’s expectation of privacy is impinged 
somewhere between the initial installation and before four weeks 
of electronic monitoring.86 Justice Alito posited that the “police 
 
 77. See id. at 404–05, 411–12 (describing the events that provided a 
justification for identifying a search). 
 78.  See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 286 (Brennan, J., concurring) (describing how 
Katz still allowed for the Fourth Amendment to afford protections to property and 
no erosion occurred merely from the idea that the Fourth Amendment protects 
people rather than property). 
 79.  Jones, 565 U.S. at 409, 411. 
 80.  See id. (describing how adopting the concurrence’s stance would 
“introduce[] yet another novelty into our jurisprudence”). 
 81.  See id. at 413–18 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (acknowledging the 
problems of technological advancement); see also id. at 418–31 (Alito, J., 
concurring) (positing that a duration shorter than four weeks of surveillance 
would likely be a search but four weeks certainly was one).  
 82.  See id. at 418–31 (Alito, J., concurring) (discussing how short-term 
monitoring may be valid under the Fourth Amendment but long-term 
surveillance goes against an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy). 
 83.  Id. at 430. 
 84.  Id.  
 85.  Id.  
 86.  See id. (concluding that relatively brief monitoring is acceptable while 
prolonged ones, like this four week surveillance, constituted a search under the 
Fourth Amendment). 
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may always seek a warrant” if uncertain “whether a certain period 
of GPS surveillance is long enough to constitute a Fourth 
Amendment Search.”87 
Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence agrees with Justice Alito in 
terms with the fact that “longer term GPS monitoring in 
investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of 
privacy.”88 This is because GPS monitoring “evades the ordinary 
checks that constrain abusive law enforcement practices.”89 
However, unlike Justice Alito’s position, Justice Sotomayor’s 
concurrence drew a firmer line.90 Justice Sotomayor premised that 
“[a]wareness that the Government may be watching chills 
associational and expressive freedoms,” and “it may be necessary 
to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third 
parties.”91 Given the quantity of personal information disclosed to 
third parties in the digital age, Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence 
did not believe that “all information voluntarily disclosed to some 
member of the public for a limited purpose if, for that reason alone, 
disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.”92 Even though the 
concurrence hoped for a stricter application by proposing an 
alternative solution to Katz and the majority, the majority chose to 
leave those “vexing problems” for some future case rather than 
resolving them in one go.93 
The Supreme Court reaffirmed Jones’ concept of intrusion in 
Carpenter v. United States,94 holding that the warrantless 
acquisition of cell-site information violated Carpenter’s Fourth 
 
 87.  Id. at 430–31.  
 88.  Id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 429–30 (Alito, J., 
concurring).  
 89.  Id. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
 90.  See id. at 413–18 (writing that it may be necessary to reconsider 
expectation of privacy for information disclosed to third parties).  
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. at 418.  
 93.  See id. at 412–13 (majority opinion) (refusing to adopt Katz exclusively 
and adopt the concurrence’s view); see also Danielle Keats Citron & David Gray, 
Addressing The Harm of Total Surveillance:  A Reply to Professor Neil Richards, 
126 HARV. L. REV. F. 262, 269–71 (2013) (discussing the privacy implications of 
mass surveillance without oversight). 
 94.  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2206–08 (2018).  
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Amendment right against searches and seizures.95 The Court 
refused to extend the “Third Party Doctrine,”96 where no 
reasonable expectation of privacy exists for information disclosed 
to third parties, when individuals did have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.97 Instead, the Court drew from both Justice 
Alito’s and Justice Sotomayor’s concurrences in Jones.98 
Recognizing “that individuals have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the whole of their physical movements,” the Court found 
that cell-site information implicated greater privacy concerns than 
did GPS tracking.99 The Court differentiated cell-site data from 
bank records and pen register data in its ability to “retrace a 
person’s whereabouts, subject only to the five-year retention 
policies of most wireless carriers.”100 This data embodied qualities 
more similar to GPS monitoring because it showcased an 
“exhaustive chronicle of location information, unlike the limited 
 
 95.  See id. at 2209–10 (finding the expectation of privacy in the current 
digital era does not fit perfectly or neatly in existing precedents, resulting in 
difficulties in application). 
 96.  The Third Party Doctrine is the idea that no reasonable expectation of 
privacy exists for information disclosed to third parties; however, courts will 
typically look at the degree of intrusiveness and whether it resembles the mosaic 
theory in order to determine if a search occurred. United States v. Maynard, 615 
F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010). The mosaic theory is the idea that a search occurs 
if the method of collection allows law enforcement to acquire an intimate look into 
an individual’s life through his or her day-to-day activities. Id. Searches in this 
particular instance are “analyzed as a collective sequence of steps rather than as 
individual steps,” since each step infringes further into the privacy rights of an 
individual. Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. 
L. REV 311, 320–26 (2012). 
 97.  See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2209–10, 2217–21 (recognizing that 
“individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of their 
movements”).  
 98.  See id. at 2217 (mentioning the Court already recognized that 
individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy for the whole of their 
movements and it is not society’s expectation for law enforcement agents to 
“secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement of an individual’s car for 
a long period”).  
 99. See id. at 2210, 2217 (contrasting the implications of cell-site information 
to the information at issue in Smith and Miller, noting especially how the 
progression of technology has evolved the reasonable expectation of privacy 
traditionally known and CSLI being more intrusive than GPS tracking). 
 100.  See id. at 2217–19 (discussing why Smith and Miller should not be 
extended in this instance to the facts of the Carpenter case); but see id. at 2223–
24 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the distinction drawn by the 
majority given the degree of information obtainable through this process). 
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nature of personal information in Smith v. Maryland101 and United 
States v. Miller.102 A cell-site information system would allow the 
Government to gather “near perfect surveillance.”103 As such, it 
violates an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy as to 
their whole physical movements.104 Since the Carpenter Court 
determined seven days of historical cell-site location information 
(CSLI) obtained from the defendant’s wireless carrier constituted 
a search,105 the holding narrows the point at which electronic 
monitoring becomes a search, as discussed in Justice Alito’s 
concurrence in Jones.106 The Court, however, explicitly limited its 
Fourth Amendment protections to the CSLI and did not extend it 
to topics not before the Court at that time.107 Therefore, the 
Carpenter decision illustrates a rather narrow application.108  
Fourth Amendment protections can thus be differentiated and 
delineated based on a number of things, such as a reasonable 
expectation within one’s home, the lack of a reasonable expectation 
of privacy on public roadways, and its application to the acquisition 
 
 101.  See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741–46 (1979) (concluding that the 
installation of a pen register by a telephone company without a warrant to not be 
a search under the Fourth Amendment since average consumers understood the 
assumption of risk involved when conveying information to a phone company, 
regardless of the fact that Smith made calls within his home, no expectation of 
privacy existed over the numbers he dialed).  
 102.  United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–43 (1976) (holding that Miller 
did not have a constitutionally protected interest in the financial records he 
provided to his bank because information revealed to a third party and then 
conveyed to the government did not constitute a Fourth Amendment violation); 
see Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219–20 (2018) (discussing the 
particular qualities of CSLI that breaches typical normal reasonable expectations 
of privacy). 
 103.  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217–19. 
 104.  See id. (differentiating between Smith and Miller and the CSLI data 
collected, while noting how the Government failed to account for technological 
advancement in their argument). 
 105.  See id. at 2214–19 (finding that the “retrospective quality of the data 
here gives police access to a category of information otherwise unknowable”).  
 106.  See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 430–31 (2012) (Alito, J., 
concurring) (discussing that there was no need to identify “the point at which the 
tracking of this vehicle became a search, for the line was surely crossed before the 
4-week mark”). 
 107.  See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2206, 2217–19 (noting that the application 
of Smith and Miller remain undisturbed by the holding in Carpenter).  
 108.  See id. at 2220–21 (writing that the holding does not extend to matters 
not before the Court, leaving other types of surveillance for a future time).  
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and retention of informational data.109 Warrantless searches are 
per se unreasonable unless an exception applies.110 Nonetheless, 
based on Fourth Amendment precedent alone, the Supreme Court 
appears to carve a niche for GPS tracking devices and cell-site 
information, based on the technology’s intrusive nature.111 While 
the majority in Jones focused only on the nature of the intrusion 
and refused to draw a hardline rule regarding extensive 
monitoring,112 Carpenter harped on the degree of intrusiveness and 
an individual’s expectation of privacy in the whole of their physical 
movements.113 Based on these rulings, it appears that a device’s 
level of intrusiveness and impediment on privacy remain special 
considerations in Fourth Amendment precedent.114  
As Fourth Amendment precedent evolves with technological 
innovations and attempts to grapple with the fact that “physical 
intrusion is now unnecessary to many forms of surveillance,”115 the 
Supreme Court determines and establishes certain exceptions to 
the Fourth Amendment to balance the interest of the government 
 
 109.  See cases cited supra notes 11, 25, 56, 64, 69, 94 (highlighting the 
different ways in which Fourth Amendment protections can be wielded).  
 110.  See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977) (describing that 
“as a general principle searches and seizures made at the border are reasonable 
simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border”).  
 111.  See Jones, 565 U.S. at 404–05, 411–12 (determining the installation of a 
GPS device to be a trespass and thus a search); see also Carpenter v. United 
States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2210, 2217–19 (2018) (determining that obtaining seven 
days of CSLI is a search). 
 112.  See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–05, 411–12 (2012) 
(unwilling to determine broader surveillance issues and focused solely on the 
trespass).  
 113.  See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2210, 2217–19 (reiterating the concurrences 
in Jones regarding an expectation of privacy even with advancements in 
technology). 
 114.  See id. (finding CSLI to concern greater privacy concerns than GPS 
tracking); see also Jones, 565 U.S. at 404–05, 411–12 (highlighting that 
common-law trespass still applies). 
 115.  Jones, 565 U.S. at 424–27 (Alito. J., concurring). 
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with the protection of an individual’s privacy.116 The Border Search 
Doctrine is one of them.117 
B. Border Search Doctrine 
An analysis of the Border Search Doctrine hinges on a number 
of factors. Due to its convoluted nature, this section breaks down 
the doctrine based on the location of the search, the type of search, 
the type of suspicion required, and the border policies known to 
date.  
The Border Search Doctrine is one of the longstanding 
warrantless search exceptions.118 Most searches at the border do 
not require a warrant or probable cause because of Congress’s 
authority to regulate commerce and maintain sovereignty.119 The 
border does not merely mean specific checkpoints of entry.120 It also 
 
 116.  See Laura Nowell, Privacy at the Border: Applying the Border Search 
Exception to Digital Searches at the United States Border, 71 FED. COMM. L.J. 85, 
88 (2018) (discussing how the Supreme Court balanced this interest through 
Terry v. Ohio and United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, where the Court held that 
a search is constitutional if government interest in the prevention of crime 
outweighs the intrusion on an individual’s Fourth Amendment interests); see also 
Alison M. Lucier, You Can Judge a Container by Its Cover:  The Single-Purpose 
Exception and the Fourth Amendment, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1809, 1809 (2009) 
(discussing the single-purpose container exception for warrantless searches); see 
also Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 
125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 476–77 (2011) (postulating that the Supreme Court adjusts 
Fourth Amendment protections in response to changing technology or social 
practices that expand government power); see Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 
413 U.S. 266, 274 (1973) (describing the balance of interests at the border to favor 
governmental interests in time of need). 
 117.  See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616–17 (1977) (illustrating 
the longstanding right afforded to border agents and searches of this nature at 
the border).  
 118.  See id. (discussing searches at the border to be a “long-standing right of 
the sovereign to protect itself” and searches of this kind “were not subject to the 
warrant provisions of the Fourth Amendment and were ‘reasonable’ within the 
meaning of the Amendment”).  
 119.  See id. at 619 (concluding that the ability for border searches to occur 
stems from the “Constitution giv[ing] Congress broad, comprehensive powers ‘to 
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,’” resulting in “reasonable” searches at 
the border); see also U.S. CONST., ART. I, § 8, cl. 3 (delineating Congress’ power of 
regulation of Commerce between foreign Nations, States and Indian Tribes); see 
also United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985) (discussing 
how interests lean heavily in favor of the government at the border).  
 120.  See Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 272–73 (providing different examples 
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includes the “functional equivalent” of a border, which can be 
described as a point of crossing or port-of-entry.121 “Actual borders 
have an international legal status.”122 This, in theory, means that 
travelers are put on “notice that searches are likely to be made.”123 
“Notice diminishes the travelers’ expectation of privacy and may 
make it reasonable to presume that they implicitly [] consented to 
a warrantless search upon their reentry into the country.”124 Aside 
from an individual’s presence at the border, courts analyze the type 
and location of the search to determine if a search is constitutional. 
1. Routine v. Non-Routine Searches 
 One factor courts utilize to distinguish border searches is 
whether the search is “routine” or “non-routine”.125 Routine 
searches differ from non-routine searches because the latter 
results in a greater degree of intrusion than the former.126 A typical 
 
of entry points that could be considered when evaluating a border crossing).  
 121.  See id. (indicating that the “permissible scope of intrusiveness of a 
routine border search might . . . in certain circumstances take place not only at 
the border itself, but at its functional equivalents,” like roads extending from the 
border).  
 122.  See PS Rosenzweig, Functional Equivalents of the Border, Sovereignty, 
and the Fourth Amendment, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1119, 1133 (1985) [hereinafter PS 
Rosenzweig, Functional Equivalent] (criticizing the current approaches to the 
functional equivalence of a border). 
 123.  See id. (discussing searches at functional equivalents of a border); see 
also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222–27 (1973) (describing the idea 
that consent is an exception to the warrant requirement); see also Mark R. 
Santana, Almeida-Sanchez and Its Progeny:  The Developing Border Zone Search 
Law, 17 ARIZ. L. REV. 214, 238 n.149 (1975) [hereinafter Santana, 
Almeida-Sanchez] (putting forth the idea that one justification for the border zone 
search is that “when a person leaves the country he is deemed to have implicitly 
consented to a border search upon his return. Thus, he can reasonably expect to 
be searched at the point where he enters the nation, whether at an airport, 
landing pier, or border checkpoint”).  
 124.  Santana, Almeida-Sanchez, supra note 123, at 238 n.149.  
 125.  See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 618–19 (1977) (discussing 
how routine searches of entrants do not require reasonable suspicion, probable 
cause, or a warrant).  
 126.  See United States v. Johnson, 991 F.2d 1287, 1291 (7th Cir. 1993) 
(discussing how routine border searches result in a lower degree of privacy 
invasion and offense to a traveler than nonroutine searches, with one requiring 
reasonable suspicion to justify it, while the other does not).  
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routine search could be anything from a pat-down to the removal 
of outer garments or an x-ray.127 On the other hand, a non-routine 
search could include anything from a strip search to other searches 
going beyond limited intrusions, such as a body cavity search.128 
The key difference is that a non-routine search requires reasonable 
suspicion while a routine one does not.129 
The Supreme Court explicitly stated in United States v. 
Flores-Montano130 that the differentiation between “routine”131 and 
“non routine” does not apply in the context of vehicular searches.132 
The Supreme Court held that the balancing test, utilized by the 
lower court, did not apply because “the reasons that might support 
a suspicion requirement in the case of highly intrusive searches of 
persons simply do not carry over to vehicles.”133 Instead, because 
“[t]he Government’s interest in preventing the entry of unwanted 
persons and effects is at its zenith at the international border,”134 
the Court rejected the assertion that a privacy interest is violated 
by a suspicionless disassembly of a fuel tank at the border.135 While 
 
 127.  See United States v. Sandler, 644 F.2d 1163, 1169 (5th Cir. 1981) 
(affirming and concluding that an “examination of a person by ordinary pat-down 
or frisk . . . [is] part of the routine examination of a person’s effects which 
require[s] no justification other than the person’s decision to cross our national 
boundary”); see also KIM, PROTECTING THE U.S. PERIMETER, supra note 28 
(distinguishing routine and non-routine searches by the differences in the degree 
of invasion of privacy as well as the degree of the search of the individual). 
 128.  See KIM, PROTECTING THE U.S. PERIMETER, supra note 28 (breaking down 
a non-routine search to “include prolonged detentions, strip searches, body cavity 
searches, and some X-ray examinations,” requiring a “reasonable suspicion” prior 
to conducting the non-routine search). 
 129.  See Johnson, 991 F.2d at 1291 (discussing how routine border searches 
result in a lower degree of privacy invasion and offense to a traveler than 
non-routine searches, with one requiring reasonable suspicion to justify it, while 
the other does not).  
 130.  United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 149 (2004). 
 131.  See id. (differentiating between the language used in United States v. 
Montoya de Hernandez for searches on individuals and the searches discussed in 
the case). 
 132.  See id. (determining a different standard for vehicles at the border 
because of the authority at the border granted by Congress).  
 133.  Id.  
 134.  Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 616. 
 135.  See Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 149 (discussing how Congress has 
consistently granted “[e]xecutive plenary authority to conduct routine searches 
and seizures at the border, without probable cause or a warrant, in order to 
regulate the collection of duties and to prevent the introduction of contraband into 
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the Fourth Amendment “protects property as well as privacy,” the 
Government’s authority allows for officials to “conduct 
suspicionless inspections at the border” to protect national 
sovereignty.136 This protection and authority includes the ability to 
“remove, disassemble, and reassemble a vehicle’s fuel tank.”137 The 
Court, however, mentioned that there are instances where “some 
searches of property are so destructive” or “particularly 
offensive,”138 to require particularized suspicion.139  
While courts differentiate between a routine and a non-routine 
search at the border, other considerations exist as the search 
moves away from the border. 
2. Extended Border Search 
The Border Search Doctrine can also include areas away from 
the border.140 An example of this is when the search occurs after 
entry into the country.141 Courts deem this an “Extended Border 
Search.”142 An Extended Border Search is more intrusive on the 
 
this country”).  
 136.  See id. (recognizing that courts lean heavily in favor of governmental 
interests at the border).  
 137.  Id. at 149–50. 
 138.  Id. As for what constitutes as an “offensive” manner, it remains an open 
question for courts to determine. See for example, Amended Order, supra note 12, 
at 5. The Ninth Circuit established two factors to determine if a border vehicle 
search requires reasonable suspicion. United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 
865, 879 (9th Cir. 2009). The court looks to whether the search damaged the 
vehicle’s safety of operability and if the search occurred in a particularly offensive 
manner. Id. 
 139.  Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 154 n.2, 156. 
 140.  See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973) 
(explaining how border searches can occur not only at the border entry itself but 
also at a “functional equivalent” or at an “extended” border).  
 141.  See United States v. Caicedo-Guarnizo, 723 F.2d 1420, 1422 (9th Cir. 
1984) (describing how the rationale of warrantless searches at international 
borders are assumed per se reasonable and the “extended border” doctrine is thus 
an expansion of this rule to ensure that borders remain secure).  
 142.  See Extended Border Search and Probable Cause, Almeida-Sanchez v. 
United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973), 1974 WASH. U. L. REV. 889, 889–94 (1973) 
(discussing the Almeida-Sanchez case and the concept of the extended border 
doctrine in connection to the case); see also Ralph V. Seep, Annotation, Validity 
of Warrantless Search Under Extended Border Doctrine, 102 A.L.R. Fed. 269 
(1991) [hereinafter Validity of Warrantless Search] (outlining the general 
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individual’s expectation of privacy because the individual, in 
theory, undergoes two searches.143 One occurs at the border and 
one after entry into the country.144 While travelers are put on 
notice for actual border searches, this expectation diminishes at 
“distant border equivalents [that] have no international status.”145 
At distant checkpoints, no clear notice is given by border agencies 
or officials.146 “Travelers who have not crossed the border thus 
cannot be thought to have given their implied consent to 
warrantless searches merely by traveling near the border.”147 If 
there is reasonable suspicion of the subject engaging in criminal 
activity, then courts consider these searches to be constitutional.148 
Law enforcement must also have “reasonable certainty” that the 
vehicle or contraband crossed the border.149 Time and distance are 
part of the reasonable suspicion analysis in determining if a search 
 
considerations in determining the validity of an extended border search, such as 
the border crossing itself, whether the search was delayed, and the presence of 
reasonable suspicion).  
 143.  See Validity of Warrantless Search, supra note 142 (indicating that both 
United States v. Diaz-Segovia and United States v. Garcia are two instances 
where courts have recognized that the extended border search doctrine involves 
situations in which the search is delayed past the first practicable detention point 
within the United States).  
 144.  See Santana, Almeida-Sanchez, supra note 123, at 238 n.149 (describing 
the implicit consent travelers provide when they cross a border zone). 
 145.  PS Rosenzweig, Functional Equivalent, supra note 122, at 1133. 
 146.  See Gary N. Jacobs, Note, Border Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 
77 YALE L.J. 1007, 1012 (1968) (setting forth the idea that “since the individual 
crossing a border is on notice that certain types of searches are likely to be made, 
his privacy is arguably less invaded by those searches”).  
 147.  PS Rosenzweig, Functional Equivalent, supra note 122, at 1133; see also 
Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 281 (Powell, J., concurring) (“One who merely 
travels in regions near the borders of the country can hardly be thought to have 
submitted to inspections in exchange for a special prerequisite.”).  
 148.  See Validity of Warrantless Search, supra note 142 (providing cases from 
the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits regarding this 
issue, while discussing how the level of suspicion rises for extended border 
searches further from the border).  
 149.  See id. (distinguishing between an extended border search and an 
ordinary border search, which has a looser standard of suspicion since an 
“extended border search[] occur[s] after the actual entry into the country has 
occurred and intrude[s] more on an individual’s normal expectation of privacy 
than regular border searches,” but it is the “totality of the circumstances 
surrounding the search” that helps make this argument for reasonable suspicion 
away from the border after some lapse of time).  
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is constitutional and reasonable given the distance from the 
border.150 
3. Reasonable Suspicion, Time and Distance 
Reasonable suspicion, in the border context, analyzes all facts 
given the situation to determine if border patrol agents violated an 
individual’s privacy rights.151 In United States v. Alfonso,152 the 
Ninth Circuit determined that border agents met the reasonable 
suspicion requirement.153 After arriving in the Los Angeles 
Harbor, border agents searched a ship, the Santa Marta, a second 
time within a day and a half of arrival.154 The Court found 
reasonable suspicion to exist because of the “information known to 
the search party in this case, including the informant’s tip, their 
own observations, and the arrests and seizure of cocaine from 
persons leaving the ship.”155 
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit found no reasonable suspicion in 
United States v. Rangel-Portillo.156 Border patrol agents detained 
 
 150.  See United States v. Caicedo-Guarnizo, 723 F.2d 1420, 1422 (9th Cir. 
1984) (commenting on how the “validity of such a search [after a border crossing] 
depends on whether the fact finder, viewing the totality of the circumstances, is 
reasonably certain that the suspected smuggler did not acquire the contraband 
after crossing the border”). 
 151.  See id. (evaluating reasonable suspicion after a border crossing); see also 
United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 266–67 (2002) (remanding the appellate 
court’s decision because in “making reasonable-suspicion determinations, 
reviewing courts must look at the ‘totality of the circumstances’ of each case to 
see whether the detaining officer has a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for 
suspecting legal wrongdoing,” which “allows officers to draw on their own 
experiences and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions 
about the cumulative information available”). 
 152. United States v. Alfonso, 759 F.2d 728, 728 (9th Cir. 1985).  
 153.  See id. (affirming the search of a Colombian vessel in the Los Angeles 
harbor as a justified extended border search because it was supported by 
reasonable suspicion).  
 154.  See id. at 734 (noting that it “is immaterial whether the situs be called 
the functional equivalent of the border, or the border itself,” instead recognizing 
“that time and place are relevant, since the level of suspicion for extended border 
searches is stricter than the standard for ordinary border searches”).  
 155.  Id. at 738. 
 156.  See United States v. Rangel-Partillo, 586 F.3d 376, 376 (5th Cir. 2009) 
(finding that the totality of the circumstances did not justify the agent to stop and 
search the defendant’s vehicle because the reasonable suspicion standard was not 
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the vehicle about 500 yards from the border.157 While the distance 
to the border factors into the court’s Fourth Amendment analysis 
and afforded great weight, distance alone does not “constitute 
reasonable suspicion to stop and search an individual’s vehicle.”158 
The “[c]ourt [decided that it could not] conclude that an agent has 
reasonable suspicion to conduct a stop anytime an individual is 
sweating while riding in a vehicle in close proximity to this nation’s 
southern border,” without more.159  
Federal law specifically provides authorized personnel, any 
officer or employee of the United States, at the border the authority 
to board, search, stop, and examine vehicles and persons with 
reasonable suspicion.160 In addition, federal statute provides CBP 
officials with the authority to stop and search vessels or other 
vehicles anywhere within “a reasonable distance from any external 
boundary of the United States.”161 The Code of Federal Regulations 
defines “reasonable distance” to “mean within 100 air miles from 
any external boundary of the United States or any shorter distance 
that may be fixed by the chief patrol agent for CBP, or the special 
agent in charge for ICE.”162 To put it into perspective, according to 
 
adequately met and decided that the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence 
“obtained as the result of an allegedly unconstitutional stop by a United States 
Border Patrol agent . . . charg[ing] that he unlawfully transported undocumented 
aliens,” should have been granted).  
 157.  Id. at 380–81.  
 158.  See id. (noting that there are various other factors to assess to evaluate 
if reasonable suspicion is met, aside from looking at the proximity to the border, 
which was the only factor evaluated in the present case).  
 159.  See id. at 382 (concluding that the “overwhelming absence of any of these 
additional factors,” led the court to not rationally find reasonable suspicion in this 
instance).  
 160.  See 19 U.S.C. § 482 (2018) (allowing “officers or persons authorized to 
board or search vessels” including “any vehicle, beast, or person, on which or 
whom he or they shall suspect there is a merchandise which is subject to duty, 
or . . . contrary to law”).  
 161.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (2018) (breaking down the powers of 
immigration officers and employees without a warrant); see also Customs and 
Border Protection’s (CBP’S) 100-Mile Rule, ACLU, 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/13_08_01_aclu_100_mile_cbp_zone
_final.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2019) (analyzing CBP’s authority given the limited 
statutory guidance on the 100-Mile Rule, which has resulted in a degree of 
extra-constitutional powers for the Agency to authorize searches and seizures) 
[perma.cc/7VE5-NYBH]. 
 162.  See 8 C.F.R. § 287.1(b) (2018) (defining “reasonable distance” based on 
its use in The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 to be within 100 miles 
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the 2010 census, about “[t]wo thirds of the U.S. population, or 
about 200 million people, reside within this expanded border 
region.”163 
The extended border defined by these statutes and regulations 
provides an expansive range of authority to border officials. For 
instance, the Ninth Circuit upheld extended border searches for 
searches from seven hours and 105 miles from the border,164 up to 
fifteen hours and twenty miles from the border.165 The Fifth Circuit 
similarly upheld an extended border search that was 150 miles 
from the border and 142 hours after a border crossing.166 This 
included an instance where customs agents accidentally allowed a 
car to pass through the border into the United States without 
initially following it.167 Instead, border officials located the car 
about thirty-five minutes later.168 The Fifth Circuit disregarded 
the thirty-five minute interval where no surveillance occurred.169 
It concluded the interval to be “too brief to have been of any 
 
or any shorter distance).  
 163.  See Know Your Rights 100 Mile Border Zone, ACLU (2019), 
https://www.aclu.org/know-your-rights/border-zone/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2019) 
(giving a brief breakdown of the Fourth Amendment and the federal government’s 
ability to conduct warrantless stops within 100 miles of the U.S. border for 
different scenarios) [perma.cc/A2FN-VUY8].  
 164.  See Castillo-Garcia v. United States, 424 F.2d 482, 482–84 (9th Cir. 
1970) (concluding that while the search of the vehicle occurred 105 miles from the 
border, the fact that there was “constant surveillance after the border crossing 
until the search, and there had been a change of drivers,” the possibility that the 
165 pounds of marijuana being placed after the crossing was obviated and the 
search was thus lawful).  
 165.  See Rodriguez-Gonzalez v. United States, 378 F.2d 256, 256–59 (9th Cir. 
1967) (affirming the lower court’s decision that a valid border search occurred 
because while there was a change in drivers after crossing the border, the 
information provided by an informant gave the customs officials reasonable 
suspicion that the defendants may have been carrying marijuana). 
 166.  See United States v. Martinez, 481 F.2d 214, 217 (5th Cir. 1973) 
(affirming the lower court’s decision that the “search and seizure which yielded 
[a] truck of marijuana [to be] within the ‘border search’ exception to the Fourth 
Amendment”).  
 167.  See id. (mentioning how initially border agents accidentally let them 
through the border without following the vehicle). 
 168.  See id. at 219 (determining reasonable suspicion trumped the thirty-five-
minute interval). 
 169.  See id. (qualifying their decision by noting that there was no reason for 
customs officials to doubt their original suspicions and constant surveillance of 
the vehicle took place after this initial thirty-five-minute period). 
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consequence,” and held that the reasonableness standard would 
not be substituted with a per se rule based on the number of miles 
traveled inland and hours after entry into the country.170 
While significant weight is given to law enforcement at the 
border under these factors, the Ninth Circuit held that the 
extended Border Search Doctrine did not apply in United States v. 
Cotterman.171 Border agents stopped Cotterman and his wife at the 
Mexican border after the Treasury Enforcement Communication 
System (TECS) returned a hit for Cotterman.172 The hit indicated 
that Cotterman was on the sex offender registry and that he was 
potentially involved in child sex tourism.173 The agents searched 
the vehicle and retrieved two laptops and three digital cameras.174 
After inspecting the electronic devices, the officer found several 
family photos along with several password-protected files.175 The 
agents allowed the Cottermans to leave the border but retained the 
laptops and digital cameras.176 The special agent then drove almost 
170 miles from the border point to Arizona to deliver the electronic 
devices to an ICE agent.177 
After determining that no contraband existed on the digital 
cameras and releasing the devices to the Cottermans, the ICE 
agent used forensic software to find seventy-five images of child 
pornography on the unallocated space in Cotterman’s laptop.178 
When ICE opened the password-protected files, they obtained 
nearly 400 images of child pornography.179 
The court determined that “[a] border search of a computer is 
not transformed into an extended border search simply because the 
device is transported and examined beyond the border.”180 Because 
 
 170.  See id. (concluding that the border search exception applied, and no 
search occurred). 
 171.  United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 961–62 (9th Cir.) (en banc), 
cert. denied, 571 U.S. 1156 (2014). 
 172.  Id. at 957.  
 173.  Id.  
 174.  Id.  
 175.  Id. at 957–58.  
 176.  Id. at 958.  
 177.  Id.  
 178.  Id.  
 179.  Id. at 958–59.  
 180.  Id. at 961. 
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the case involved “a search initiated at the actual border and does 
not encounter any difficulties surrounding identification of a 
‘functional border,’” the court confined the analysis to situations 
where, “an attenuation in the time or location of conducting a 
search reflects that the subject has regained an expectation of 
privacy.”181 Here, “Cotterman never regained possession of his 
laptop, [and] the fact that the forensic examination occurred away 
from the border . . . did not heighten the interference with his 
privacy.”182 Time and distance apply “only after the subject or 
items searched have entered” the United States.183 Because 
“Cotterman’s computer never cleared customs [and] entry was 
never effected,” the extended border search doctrine did not 
apply.184 
Cotterman showcases a grey area in determining when an 
individual regains a heightened expectation of privacy at and near 
the border.185 Cotterman thus highlights the juncture between 
“classic” Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and the Border Search 
Doctrine, and the difficulties in delineating a clear line between 
the two concepts.186 Reasonable suspicion along with time and 
distance help to determine if a search is constitutional under the 
Border Search Doctrine.187 The analysis however is not clear-cut, 
and the existence of border policies poses another complicated 
layer for courts to analyze because of the lack of transparency and 
the possible breadth of interpretation. 
4. Border Search Policies Known to Date 
DHS and CBP publish specific border policies and regulations 
to set certain parameters and highlight governmental authority.188 
 
 181.  Id. at 961–62.  
 182.  Id. at 962.  
 183.  Id.  
 184.  Id.  
 185.  Id. at 961–62. 
 186.  See supra text accompanying notes 171–184. 
 187.  See supra text accompanying notes 151–170. 
 188.  See Border Security, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., 
https://www.cbp.gov/border-security (last updated Feb. 5, 2020) (last visited Sept. 
27, 2020) (explaining CBP’s mission at the border) [perma.cc/UCG2-3RZ6].  
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The CBP updated its policy (CBP Border Policy) on border searches 
of electronic devices on January 4, 2018.189 Before this, CBP’s 
previous policy allowed for border agents to search a traveler’s 
electronic devices without having to show any suspicion of any 
wrongdoing.190 Interest groups such as the EFF heavily criticized 
this old policy.191 
The new policy, however, purportedly differentiates between a 
“basic” search and an “advanced” one.192 Basic searches are those 
not deemed “advanced.”193 It may be conducted with or without 
suspicion, where the officer may “examine an electronic device and 
may review and analyze information encountered at the border.”194 
An advanced search on the other hand, involves the officer utilizing 
external equipment, “through a wired or wireless connection, to an 
electronic device not merely to gain access to the device, but to 
 
 189.  See U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Border Search of Electronic 
Devices, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Jan. 4, 2018), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/CBP%20Directive%203340-
049A_Border-Search-of-Electronic-Media.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2019) 
[hereinafter U.S. Customs and Border Protection 2018] (outlining the “guidance 
and standard operating procedures for searching, reviewing, retaining, and 
sharing information contained in computers, tablets . . . and any other 
communication, electronic, or digital devices subject to inbound and outbound 
border searches by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)”) [perma.cc/G2PT-
WGFJ].  
 190.  See U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Private Impact Assessment for the 
Border Searches of Electronic Devices, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Aug. 25, 2009), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy_pia_cbp_laptop.pdf 
(last visited Jan. 19, 2020) [hereinafter DHS, Searches of Electronic Devices] 
(discussing the legal foundation for the border search exception while 
distinguishing between the privacy interests between electronic devices as 
opposed to traditional items found at the border, such as a briefcase or a 
backpack) [perma.cc/PGT5-DX9P]. 
 191.  See Sophia Cope & Aaron Mackey, New CBP Border Device Search Policy 
Still Permits Unconstitutional Searches, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 8, 2018), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/01/new-cbp-border-device-search-policy-still-
permits-unconstitutional-searches (last visited Jan. 19, 2020) (comparing the new 
policy against the old policy to analyze the potential loopholes and vague 
language, which could lead to violations to travelers’ constitutional rights) 
[perma.cc/5AV4-LTT2].  
 192.  See U.S. Customs and Border Protection 2018, supra note 189 
(explaining the different procedures taken at the border depending on whether 
the search is basic or advanced for electronic devices held at the border).  
 193.  Id. 
 194.  Id.  
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review, copy, and/or analyze its contents.”195 Either reasonable 
suspicion or the presence of a “national security concern” permits 
an advanced search.196 
The policy provides some examples, but no formal definition in 
the text describes what constitutes a “national security concern.”197 
An individual can remain present during the search, unless “there 
are national security, law enforcement, officer safety, or other 
operational considerations that make it inappropriate to permit 
the individual to remain present.”198 “Travelers [have an 
obligation] to present electronic devices and the information 
contained therein in a condition that allows inspection of the device 
and its contents.”199 While officers retrieve or access remotely 
stored information on a device, they must disable network 
connectivity, i.e. turn on airplane mode.200 This policy will not be 
reviewed again until January of 2021.201 
In 2019, Judge Casper of the United States District Court for 
the District of Massachusetts concluded that no distinction exists 
between manual and forensic device searches, as dictated by other 
 
 195.  Id.  
 196.  See id. (noting that the new policy requires supervisory approval by a 
Grade 14 level or higher for an advanced search of an electronic device by an 
officer and examples of a national security concern include, “existence of a 
relevant national security-related lookout combination with other articulable 
factors as appropriate, or the presence of an individual on a government-operated 
and government-vetted terrorist watch list”).  
 197.  See U.S. Customs and Border Protection 2018, supra note 189 (describing 
how all searches are ultimately documented in the appropriate CBP systems, and 
if a supervisor is not available to be present during the search, then the examining 
Officer is required to notify the appropriate supervisor of the results as soon as 
possible).  
 198.  See id. (emphasizing that this permission does not mean that the 
individual is allowed to observe the search itself because of the possibility of 
revealing “law enforcement techniques or potentially compromis[ing] other 
operational considerations”).  
 199.  Id.  
 200.  See id. (providing that the easiest way is to place the device in airplane 
mode to avoid violating privacy issues in this regard).  
 201.  Id.  
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courts.202 In Alasaad v. McAleenan,203 the court found that 
international travelers have a significant privacy interest in their 
digital data at the border.204 The case began as a constitutional 
challenge to the policies regarding search and seizures of electronic 
devices at the border.205 Yet, it ended when the court ruled that 
suspicionless electronic device searches at the border violate the 
Fourth Amendment.206 
The court decided that both types of searches now require 
reasonable suspicion instead of probable cause.207 The court did not 
find a meaningful distinction between the two types of searches. 
Consequently, the distinction between a “basic” and an “advanced” 
search provided in the CBP guidelines no longer exists under this 
determination.208 Instead, the decision “declare[d] that the CBP 
and ICE policies for ‘basic’ and ‘advanced’ searches, as presently 
defined, violate the Fourth Amendment to the extent that the 
policies do not require reasonable suspicion that the devices 
contain contraband.”209 This broad ruling encompasses not only 
U.S. citizens but international travelers as well and heightens 
concerns regarding privacy interests at the border.210 
Border search agents or agents along the border consequently 
have a great deal of authority under the border search exception.211 
 
 202.  See Memorandum and Order at 33–38, Alasaad v. McAleenan, No. 17-cv-
11730-DJC (D. Mass. Nov. 12, 2019), ECF No. 109 [hereinafter Alasaad Order] 
(determining that reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause applied to 
both a basic and advanced search as described in CBP and ICE’s border policies); 
see also United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1232, 1235 (11th Cir. 2018) 
(holding that “searches at the border of the country ‘never require probable cause 
or warrant” because “the advent of sophisticated technological means for 
concealing contraband only heightens the need of the government to search 
property at the border unencumbered by judicial second-guessing”).  
 203.  Alasaad v. McAleenan, No. 17-cv-11730-DJC (D. Mass. Nov. 12, 2019).  
 204.  See Alasaad Order, supra note 202, at 33–38 (holding that expungement 
of all information gathered from, or copies made of, contents of travelers’ 
electronic devices during unconstitutional border searches was not warranted). 
 205.  Id.  
 206.  Id. 
 207.  Id.  
 208.  See id. (deciding both searches require reasonable suspicion). 
 209.  Id. at 46–47. 
 210.  See id. (determining that searches going forward for electronic devices 
require reasonable suspicion prior to the search). 
 211.  See United States v. Martinez, 481 F.2d 214, 218 (5th Cir. 1973) (noting 
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No matter the item searched, agents are given a great deal of 
latitude based on the precedent at hand.212 Despite the fact that 
government interests may be broader at the border, law 
enforcement must still show “the degree to which [the search 
exception] is needed for the promotion of legitimate government 
interests.”213 This, however, does not mean that courts will allow 
suspicionless searches in every circumstance.214 
III. The Tension Between the Fourth Amendment and the Border 
Search Doctrine 
Technological advancement poses a problematic hurdle for the 
Fourth Amendment and the Border Search Doctrine. This next 
section highlights the growing tension between the two doctrines 
created by GPS tracking and the problematic new policies 
disclosed through United States v. Ignjatov. 
A. GPS Tracking & Its Place in The Fourth Amendment 
Flores-Montano ensures that a vehicle may be searched at the 
border with a limited amount of suspicion.215 However, the 
Supreme Court in Jones held that warrantless installation of a 
GPS on an individual’s car violates the Fourth Amendment.216 A 
great degree of overlap between these two doctrines exists and may 
pose problematic consequences moving forward. United States v. 
Ignjatov highlights this overlap and challenge. 
1. United States v. Ignjatov 
 
that “courts have long recognized that the border is an elastic concept, not 
susceptible to precise definition in temporal or spatial terms,” which is necessary 
to allow for customs officials to adequately manage the border).  
 212.  See supra notes 118–187 and accompanying text. 
 213.  Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014).  
 214.  See Alasaad Order, supra note 202, at 33–38 (noting that the 
government’s differentiation between the two searches lacked reasonableness).  
 215.  See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 149 (2004) (holding 
that the search did not require reasonable suspicion). 
 216.  United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 400–01, 404–05, 411–12 (2012). 
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In United States v. Ignjatov, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigations (FBI) and the LAPD investigated a drug ring 
running from Toronto through Chicago to Southern California.217 
After seizing ten duffle bags containing cocaine from an individual 
named Karac, who entered into the United States in 2017 from 
Canada in a Bo-Mak truck, a confidential source revealed the 
possibility of another dry run in the near future.218 On October 19, 
2017, the CBP notified Special Agent Hanna Monroe that the 
defendants would enter the United States in a Bo-Mak truck, 
matching the one that Karac used in March.219  
At the request of the FBI and the LAPD, a CBP officer placed 
two GPS tracking devices on the defendants’ truck and trailer at 
the border on October 20, 2017.220 DHS agents also inspected the 
vehicles at the border but found nothing unusual.221 From there, 
FBI agents and LAPD tracked the vehicle on their computers for 
the next thirty-three hours as the truck made its way to Los 
Angeles.222 The government utilized a program called Covert 
Tracker to track the GPS devices.223 Agents could log on to the 
program at any location to verify the GPS data.224 The device not 
only recorded the historical location data, but it also recorded the 
 
 217.  See Cyrus Farivar, Cheese Danish Shipping, Warrantless GPS Trackers, 
and a Border Doctrine Challenge, ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 2, 2018, 10:50 AM), 
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2018/09/judge-to-feds-no-you-cant-
warrantlessly-put-a-gps-device-on-truck-entering-us/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2020) 
[hereinafter Farivar, Cheese Danish] (reporting on the facts of United States v. 
Ignjatov, how LAPD and FBI knew of the individuals running the ring, the 
ultimate ruling handed down by Judge Bernal, and the implications of 
warrantless tracking permitted at the border) [perma.cc/8T8P-NRQ8]; see also 
Ignjatov Complaint, supra note 2, at 1–19 (laying out the allegations and 
background leading to the arrest). 
 218.  See EFF Complaint, supra note 1, at 1 (outlining the details and 
reasoning for the filing of litigation, as well as referencing the problematic nature 
of Homeland Security’s policies). 
 219.  See Amended Order, supra note 12, at 2 (describing the facts of the case 
prior to ruling). 
 220.  Id.  
 221.  Id. 
 222.  See Ignjatov Complaint, supra note 2, at 13–19 (documenting and 
describing the surveillance progress while tailing the vehicle). 
 223.  See id. (noting the program is able to obtain a nearly exact address). 
 224.  See id. (noting the program keeps all historic locational data which 
agents can see upon sign-in, as well as download the data to Excel). 
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speed of the vehicle.225 The recording intervals were set for every 
fifteen minutes, but agents increased this as the defendants 
approached California.226  
Physical surveillance of the truck did not begin until October 
22 when the defendants drove from San Bernardino County to Los 
Angeles County.227 When the defendants finally stopped near an 
airport, law enforcement officers approached and only found, “15 
four-pound packages of sugar, cheese Danishes, numerous cell 
phones, and an empty duffle bag, which when sniffed by police dogs 
“alerted [the officers] to the presence of narcotics.”228 LAPD 
released both men but arrested the defendants as they attempted 
to return to Canada for conspiracy to traffic cocaine.229 The GPS 
trackers remained on the vehicles until their arrest.230 
The defendants argued that the government’s warrantless 
installation and monitoring of their vehicles violated their Fourth 
Amendment rights.231 Relying on Jones, the defendants argued 
that the warrantless use of a GPS is illegal when the installation 
amounts to a trespass, regardless of the fact that a “border search” 
and an “extended border search” are exceptions to the search 
warrant requirement.232 The government, in turn, argued that the 
“installation and use of GPS devices were lawful [under the border 
search doctrine], and even if not, the evidence [was] admissible 
 
 225.  Id. 
 226.  Id. 
 227. Id.  
 228.  See Farivar, Cheese Danish, supra note 217 (relaying the facts behind 
the arrest of the two defendants).  
 229.  See id. (noting that both defendants were arrested in Port Huron, MI as 
they were returning to Canada). 
 230.  See Ignjatov Complaint, supra note 2, at 13–19 (stating that special 
agents were monitoring defendants until their arrest on Oct. 28, 2017); see also 
Gruel Declaration, supra note 10, at 9 (highlighting that on Oct. 19, 2017, GPS 
tracking devices were applied to the truck). 
 231.  See Joint Notice of Mot. and Mot. to Suppress Evidence by Defendants 
Ignjatov and Hristovski at 6, United States v. Ignjatov, No. 5:17-cr-00222-JGB, 
(C.D. Cal. May 11, 2018), ECF No. 86 (breaking down Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence and why United States v. Jones should apply).  
 232.  See id. at 8–15 (arguing that border search exception should not apply 
because the GPS allows tracking away from the border, which did not fall under 
the extended border doctrine).  
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under the attenuation, inevitable discovery, and good faith 
exceptions to the exclusionary rule.”233 
The judge in Ignjatov ruled in favor of the defendants following 
United States v. Jones.234 The court determined that “the key to 
determining whether the search required reasonable suspicion 
depend[ed] on the intrusiveness of the vehicle search.”235 The court 
found border vehicle search cases like Flores-Montano and 
subsequent Ninth Circuit cases focused on “whether the 
government’s search resulted in physical damage or destruction to 
the vehicle at issue.”236 These vehicle search cases “all involved 
searches conducted and completed at the border, which [had] 
‘minimal or no impact beyond the search itself.’”237 The court 
differentiated these cases from Ignjatov because it did not believe 
that “an analysis dependent on the physical aspects of the search 
is appropriate here where the search extends beyond the 
installation of the GPS device.”238 
Instead, the Ignjatov court delineated certain limitations to 
the border search doctrine.239 In particular, the court concluded 
that “[o]nce the entity at issue is beyond the border, the concerns 
animating the border search doctrine, namely the integrity of the 
border, diminish, and the robust Fourth Amendment requirements 
adhere.”240 Installing the GPS device onto the vehicle, while not 
“akin to reading a diary line by line,”241 exceeded the “scope of the 
 
 233.  Amended Order, supra note 12, at 4; see also Gov’t’s Opposition to 
Defendants Slavco Ignjatov and Valentine Hristovski’s Joint Mot. to Suppress 
Evidence at 10–25, United States v. Ignjatov, No. 5:17-cr-00222-JGB, (C.D. Cal. 
May 21, 2018), ECF No. 87 (arguing that the installation was lawful and 
supported by probable cause, and even if not, it is admissible under the 
attenuation and inevitable discovery exceptions and good faith exception). 
 234.  See Amended Order, supra note 12, at 5–8, 15 (determining both the 
border search doctrine and extended border search doctrine did not apply). 
 235.  Id. at 5. 
 236.  Id. at 5–6. 
 237.  Id. at 6.  
 238.  Id.  
 239.  See id. at 7 (differentiating between the extended border and the border 
itself to find that neither exception applied to the installation of the GPS device).  
 240.  Id.  
 241.  United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 961–62 (9th Cir.) (en banc), 
cert. denied, 571 U.S. 1156 (2014). 
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suspicionless searches authorized in the border vehicle cases.”242 
This was because the installation of a GPS device “implicates a 
search away from the border, once the target has gained entry into 
the country.243 Applying Jones, where the Supreme Court “defined 
the search as encompassing both the installation and use of the 
GPS,”244 Ignjatov refused to extend the border search doctrine to a 
point beyond the border where a “precise comprehensive record of 
a person’s public movements”245 could be acquired.246 
The Ignjatov court also determined that the installation of the 
GPS and the subsequent monitoring were not justified under the 
extended border search.247 Relying on Justice Alito’s concurrence 
in Jones,248 the court determined that even though the electronic 
surveillance occurred for fewer than 48 hours, “it is this unceasing 
search over the period that precludes the application of the 
extended border search doctrine.”249 The court found extended 
border search cases to typically encompass a definitive search at 
some distance from the border, unlike here.250 The search here 
differed significantly because the government agents tracked the 
defendants’ truck and trailer for almost 48 hours, and “the Covert 
Tracker program obtained [the] Defendants’ location information 
at regular intervals.”251 It also permitted government agents to 
 
 242.  Amended Order, supra note 12, at 7. 
 243.  Id.  
 244.  Id.; United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–05, 411–12 (2012). 
 245.  United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
 246.  See Amended Order, supra note 12, at 7 (discussing the ramifications of 
an extension of the border search doctrine). 
 247.  See id. at 8 (finding that the tracking utilized in Ignjatov to be “poles 
apart” from discrete searches under the extended border search doctrine and thus 
not an exception).  
 248.  See Jones, 565 U.S. at 420 (Alito, J., concurring) (discussing how a search 
occurred prior to the four-week mark in Jones).  
 249.  Amended Order, supra note 12, at 8. 
 250.  See id. (finding the search in Ignjatov to go beyond the searches as those 
under the extended border doctrine); see also Rodriguez-Gonzalez v. United 
States, 378 F.2d 256, 258 (9th Cir. 1967) (noting that to determine whether a 
search is legal when it is not at the immediate border, a court must look at the 
totality of the circumstances, which includes time and distance); see also United 
States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 877–78 (9th Cir. 2009) (emphasizing that 
border searches can occur at a “functional border” with no suspicion as long as 
they are not “unreasonably intrusive”). 
 251.  Amended Order, supra note 12, at 8. 
GPS TRACKING AT THE BORDER  197 
download all of the historic data recorded from any device at any 
time.252 This type of tracking “is poles apart from the discrete 
searches conducted under the extended border search doctrine.”253 
The court accordingly concluded that the search of the truck along 
with the installation of the GPS device did not classify as an 
extended border search.254 
B. Unknown Policies & Ongoing Electronic Frontier Foundation 
Suit 
While the court in Ignjatov applied the Jones intrusion test to 
grant the defendants’ motion to suppress, it also addressed how 
the border search doctrine fared post Jones and effectively limited 
the government’s authority in this domain.255  
The government argued and submitted declarations stating 
that DHS’s policy allowed for “customs officers [to] install a GPS 
tracking device on a vehicle at the United States border without a 
warrant or individualized suspicion.”256 Moreover, “[Homeland 
Security Investigation (HSI)] limit[ed] warrantless GPS 
monitoring to 48 hours, with the exception of airplanes, 
commercial vehicles, and semi-tractor trailers, which have a 
significantly reduced expectation of privacy in the location of their 
vehicles.”257 The declaration suggested that DHS believed HSI’s 
position and policy to be “consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in . . . Jones . . . [and] Flores-Montano . . . .”258 Assistant 
Director Matthew C. Allen finished his declaration by indicating 
 
 252.  See id. (discussing the tracking program utilized by border officials 
during the surveillance).  
 253.  Id.  
 254.  See id. (determining that based on the totality of circumstances, the 
installation could not be classified as an extended border search). 
 255.  See id. (“Therefore, this Court is hesitant to mechanically apply the 
border search doctrine where the search stretches far beyond the conduct at the 
border . . . .”).  
 256.  See Allen Declaration, supra note 17, at 1–3 (providing a formal 
statement as the “Assistant Director (AD) for the Domestic Operations Division 
within the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) Homeland Security Investigations (HSI)”). 
 257.  Id.  
 258.  Id.  
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that “HSI’s position on the use of GPS tracking devices were [sic] 
developed in consultation with the Department of Justice, in 
response to the 2012 Jones decision, and is found in HSI policies 
and procedures,” including “trainings regularly provided to HSI 
personnel.”259 No further mention of these policies occurred during 
discovery.260 A lack of transparency regarding these policies and 
procedures can result in inconsistent applications and enforcement 
measures by law enforcement at the border, which can lead to an 
imbalance in privacy expectations by citizenry.261  
Since this decision, the EFF brought suit against DHS to learn 
more about these policies and procedures.262 The suit is ongoing, 
but it came after the Electronic Frontier Foundation submitted a 
FOIA request to ICE for “records pertaining to the agency’s policies 
and procedures regarding the use of GPS tracking devices at the 
U.S. border.”263 
The request sought two types of information: “(1) Policies 
and/or procedures regarding the use of the GPS tracking devices 
on vehicles crossing the border; and (2) Training manuals and/or 
training materials on the use of GPS tracking devices on vehicles 
crossing the border.”264 ICE sent a response on March 11, 2019, 
indicating that a search through ICE’s HSI produced three pages 
of relevant materials; however, “all three pages would be withheld 
under Exemption 7(E).”265 Exemption 7(E) affords law enforcement 
agencies the ability to deny a request for information that would 
“disclose techniques and procedures . . . or would disclose 
guidelines for law enforcement investigations or 
 
 259.  Id.  
 260.  See Amended Order, supra note 12, at 8 (discussing the policy’s specifics 
known at the time). 
 261.  See Gruel Declaration, supra note 10, at 2 (describing how in his sixteen 
years as an AUSA and ten years as Chief of the General Crimes Section, he has 
never heard of “a border exception permitting the warrantless installation of a 
GPS tracking device or some sort of 48 hour-rule,” even after asking several other 
agents, no one “had heard of this ‘48 hour rule’ or the ‘commercial vehicle 
exception’”). 
 262.  See EFF Complaint, supra note 1, at 1 (highlighting the problematic 
practices unknown to the general public and the impasse currently in place while 
DHS and CBP refuse to comply and fulfill EFF’s FOIA request). 
 263.  Id. 
 264.  Id. at 3–4. 
 265.  Id. at 4. 
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procedures . . . [that] could reasonably be expected to risk 
circumvention of the law.”266 EFF filed an administrative appeal 
shortly afterwards to challenge the withholding of records and the 
adequacy of ICE’s search for records.267 ICE has since conducted 
supplemental searches and four “productions.”268 ICE processed 
521 pages of material, withholding some information pursuant to 
an Exemption, on December 30, 2019.269 ICE then processed 1,091 
pages of potentially responsive material on March 5, 2020, but only 
produced ninety-four pages because the others were deemed 
non-responsive.270 On May 5, 2020, ICE provided EFF “with a 
cover letter stating that ICE had processed 577 pages of material 
and zero pages were responsive to [EFF’s] FOIA request.”271 
Finally, on July 6, 2020, ICE made its final interim production to 
EFF’s FOIA request, producing 361 pages as responsive, even 
though it processed 576 pages.272 ICE provided no other 
information regarding these documents.273 Similarly, CBP has 
since conducted a supplemental search to EFF’s original request, 
and returned approximately forty-nine records.274 However, after 
reviewing for responsiveness, CBP reported on April 1, 2020 that 
forty-seven records were nonresponsive, and one record was 
withheld under an Exemption.275 CBP provided no other 
 
 266.  Department of Justice Guide to the Freedom of Information Act 
Exemption 7(E), U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/oip/foia-
guide/exemption_7_e/download (last visited Feb. 4, 2020) [hereinafter Exemption 
7(E)] (describing how Exemption 7(E) affords protection to law enforcement 
information that “could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law”) 
[perma.cc/4KQB-TT5L]. 
 267.  See EFF Complaint, supra note 1, at 4 (arguing that ICE had failed to 
provide details as to why the records risked circumvention of the law). 
 268.  See Joint Status Report at 1–2, Elec. Frontier Found. v. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., No. 1:19-cv-02578 (D.C.C. July 6, 2020), ECF No. 12 (highlighting 
the requests and productions to date and requesting for the litigation to proceed 
to cross-motions of summary judgment). 
 269.  See id. (stating ICE withheld materials due to Exemptions 5, 6, 7(C) and 
7(E)). 
 270.  See id. at 2. (noting that the second interim response also withheld 
materials under FOIA Exemptions 5, 6, 7(C) and 7(E)). 
 271.  Id.  
 272.  Id. 
 273.  Id. at 1–3. 
 274.  Id. at 3. 
 275.  Id. 
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information regarding these documents, and only referred one 
document to ICE for processing.276 
As of Aug. 6, 2020, both parties submitted status reports but 
await resolution in the overall suit.277 Given this, knowledge of 
CBP and DHS policies regarding GPS tracking at the border 
remain limited to the Declarations filed in Ignjatov.278 Without 
further information, these policies remain vague and ambiguous 
given Fourth Amendment precedent to date. Transparency keeps 
individuals and agencies accountable for their actions by providing 
notice and consent. Without fully understanding the reasoning and 
authority for these policies and procedures, violations to privacy 
will continue if left unchecked. Given the problematic nature of 
these policies if left unchecked, the next section addresses these 
policies, given the limited facts known to date, and their place in 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
IV. GPS Devices & Current Border Policies 
Fourth Amendment precedent, while evolving, remains 
stagnant and burdened by the advancements of technology.279 
Courts grapple with changing technologies while remaining 
faithful to Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy test and the 
common law of trespass.280 At the same time, the Border Search 
Doctrine remains steadfast in granting law enforcement officers 
with an expansive degree of authority to protect national 
interests.281 This section highlights the overlapping and competing 
nature of the two doctrines, while evaluating where a GPS 
tracking device should fall on this spectrum given precedent and 
policies known to date. 
 
 276.  Id.  
 277.  EFF Order, supra note 22. 
 278.  Asatur Declaration, supra note 5, at 2–4; Monroe Declaration, supra note 
9, at 5–8; Gruel Declaration, supra note 10, at 1–9; Allen Declaration, supra note 
17, at 1–3. 
 279.  See discussion supra Sections II.A–B, III.A–B.  
 280.  See discussion supra Section II.A. 
 281.  See discussion supra Section II.B. 
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A. Classic Fourth Amendment Interpretation 
If a court analyzes the installation of a GPS tracking device 
and subsequent electronic monitoring at the border solely under 
“classic” Fourth Amendment precedent, then a court should 
determine the installation and surveillance to be an 
unconstitutional search, similar to Jones and Carpenter.282 The 
Supreme Court in Jones determined that the nature of the 
intrusion determined the unconstitutionality rather than Katz’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy.283 It found the installation of a 
GPS device without a warrant, regardless of the duration used for 
tracking, to violate the Fourth Amendment.284 The Supreme Court 
in Carpenter then found locational privacy to exist and determined 
that extensive tracking of an individual violates the Fourth 
Amendment.285 If applied directly to the border context, then the 
physical intrusion and violation of privacy from the installation 
and surveillance using a GPS tracking device follows the same 
logic.286 Even if courts determine that the installation at the border 
is not a violation under Jones, Carpenter should still apply and 
constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.287 Even though 
Carpenter draws the line at seven days for CSLI data, a court will 
likely find locational privacy violated before this threshold, thus 
finding the installation and surveillance to be an unconstitutional 
 
 282.  See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 401–03, 408–12 (2012) 
(concluding that intruding on an individual’s property is a search); see also 
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217–19 (2018) (determining that 
obtaining seven days of CSLI was a search). 
 283.  See Jones, 565 U.S. at 404, 408–12 (holding the GPS installation to be a 
search).  
 284.  See id. (holding the GPS tracker violated the Fourth Amendment due do 
the trespass that had to have occurred in order to install the device). 
 285.  See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2210, 2217–19 (maintaining the idea that 
individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of their 
movements). 
 286.  See supra notes 283–285 and accompanying text. 
 287.  See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2210, 2217–19 (determining that a person 
has a right to their locational privacy). 
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search.288 Jones and Carpenter are binding precedents, and 
therefore, lower courts must follow them.289 
This analysis, however, complicates under the Border Search 
Doctrine. 
B. Applying the Border Search Doctrine 
Even though the district court judge in Ignjatov determined 
that it was unconstitutional to install a GPS monitoring device to 
Ignjatov’s vehicle under Jones, a few problems remain.290 First, the 
brief disclosure of DHS and CBP’s border policy highlights an 
incongruity between Fourth Amendment precedent and what 
enforcement agencies deem permissible under the Border Search 
Doctrine.291 Second, Ignjatov illustrates the growing tension 
between “classic” Fourth Amendment Supreme Court doctrine and 
the Border Search Doctrine as a whole.292 Consequently, it is 
necessary to determine whether a GPS monitoring device falls 
under the Border Search Doctrine, the Fourth Amendment, or a 
combination of the two. 
An analysis under the Border Search Doctrine requires a 
multi-level inquiry, focusing on the type of search, the location of 
the search and the border policies to date, as well as Fourth 
 
 288.  See id. (holding that when the Government accessed CLSI data from 
wireless carriers, it invaded the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy); 
see also Amended Order, supra note 12, at 1–8 (determining that the GPS 
tracking and surveillance utilized to constitute a search under the Fourth 
Amendment).  
 289.  See John M. Walker, Jr., The Role of Precedent in the United States: How 
Do Precedents Lose Their Binding Effect?, STAN. LAW SCH. CHINA GUIDING CASES 
PROJECT (Feb. 29, 2016), https://cgc.law.stanford.edu/wp-
content/uploads/sites/2/2016/02/CGCP-English-Commentary-15-Judge-
Walker.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2020) (discussing stare decisis and its effect on 
the judicial system) [perma.cc/9LC9-DCCB]. 
 290.  See Amended Order, supra note 12, at 4–8 (granting defendants’ motion 
to suppress). 
 291.  See Allen Declaration, supra note 17, at 2–3 (mentioning the policy 
purportedly being in line with the Border Search Doctrine, Jones, and Flores-
Montano); see also discussion supra Part II. 
 292.  See Amended Order, supra note 12, at 1–8 (analyzing the GPS device 
under the Border Search Doctrine and “classic” Fourth Amendment principles to 
determine that the GPS tracking and surveillance to not be an exception under 
the Border Search Doctrine). 
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Amendment principles. An evaluation of the installation of a GPS 
device and subsequent monitoring in each context follows. 
1. GPS device in a Routine v. Non-Routine Context 
If a court evaluates the installation of a GPS tracking device 
at the border and its subsequent surveillance, then the Border 
Search Doctrine should not allow for officials to “conduct 
suspicionless inspections at the border” based on Jones293 and 
Carpenter.294 Jones concluded that the “Government’s installation 
of a GPS device on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that device to 
monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a ‘search.’”295 The 
Jones Court, however, did not evaluate the duration of the tracking 
but rather looked at the intrusion.296 Five Justices argued in 
Carpenter that locational privacy existed as mentioned in Jones, 
determining that an individual maintains a “legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the record of his movements . . . [through 
his] location information.”297 Additionally, Carpenter explicitly 
determined that obtaining seven days of location information by 
tracking an individual violates the Fourth Amendment.298 The 
Court mentions in the holding that CSLI is more intrusive than 
GPS tracking.299 A connection between CSLI and GPS tracking is 
therefore possible.300 Taken together, a search, in the GPS context 
at the border, needs to be separated out first by the installation 
and then by the subsequent tracking.301 
 
 293.  See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–05, 411–12 (2012) 
(concluding the installation to trespass on property). 
 294.  See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (deciding 
the location information obtained was a search).  
 295.  Jones, 565 U.S. at 404.  
 296.  See id. at 405–11 (discussing why the trespass on property implicated a 
search).  
 297.  See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct at 2213–20 (highlighting why surveillance is 
detrimental).  
 298.  See id. at 2217–19 (determining CSLI obtained extended beyond 
expectations of privacy). 
 299.  See id. at 2218 (explaining that CSLI poses “greater privacy concerns 
than the GPS monitoring . . . in Jones”).  
 300.  See supra notes 293, 297–298 and accompanying text. 
 301.  See infra notes 302–358 and accompanying text.  
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Based on Flores-Montano, no balancing test is applicable and 
the differentiation between a “routine” and “non-routine” search is 
irrelevant for vehicle searches at the border.302 This, however, 
should not be applicable to the installation of the tracking device 
and subsequent monitoring.303 Unlike the disassembly of a fuel 
tank at the border, the installation of a tracking device is more 
intrusive and does not conclude at the border.304 While both may 
be based on a degree of suspicion of some sort, one focuses on 
finding tangible evidence of wrongdoing, such as contraband, at 
the border.305 On the other hand, the installation focuses on the 
accumulation of informational data, regardless of the tangible 
evidence located in the vehicle at the time of crossing the border.306 
The vehicle search in Flores-Montano commenced and ceased at 
the border.307 The installation of a GPS tracking device is more 
intrusive than the disassembly of a fuel tank because notice and 
consent are given for the latter while none is given for the 
 
 302.  See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 149 (2004) (finding 
greater government interests in the vehicular context and thus no reasonable 
suspicion is required for vehicular searches).  
 303.  See Amended Order, supra note 12, at 1–8 (concluding that GPS 
installation and monitoring is an extensive search and not one solely rooted at 
the border). 
 304.  See id. (determining that the use of the tracking program provided 
instantaneous data). 
 305.  See Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 149 (highlighting how Congress grants 
executive plenary authority for routine searches at the border to not only regulate 
border duties but to prevent contraband from entering into this country); see also 
United States v. Caicedo-Guarnizo, 723 F.2d 1420, 1422 (9th Cir. 1984) (pointing 
out that the validity of a search depends on the totality of the circumstances and 
being reasonably certain that contraband was acquired after crossing the border).  
 306.  See Amended Order, supra note 12, at 7 (concluding that “data collection 
inherent in GPS monitoring exceeds the scope of the suspicionless searches 
authorized in the border vehicle cases” and that the “placement of a GPS device 
at the border necessarily implicates a search away from the border, once the 
target has gained entry into the country”); see also United States v. Jones, 565 
U.S. 400, 420 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (defining the search to be both the 
installation and use of the GPS device, instead of separating out the two 
procedures); see also Ignjatov Complaint, supra note 2, at 1–13 (noting how the 
initial search did not turn up any contraband and law enforcement utilized it as 
an opportunity to attach the GPS tracking devices).  
 307.  See Amended Order, supra note 12, at 7 (emphasizing that the 
“surreptitious surveillance of an individual’s movements through placement of a 
GPS device on a vehicle implicates far greater privacy concerns than the physical 
integrity of the vehicle, and extends beyond the permissible scope of a border 
search”).  
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former.308 An individual can reasonably expect to be searched at a 
point where he enters into the country; however, it is the manner 
in which law enforcement conducts the search that makes the GPS 
installation more intrusive.309 While the disassembly is complete 
at the border, the installation is only the beginning of the search 
in question and can continue for an indefinite period of time.310 
Even though the Border Search Doctrine provides tremendous 
latitude to border officials to protect the international border, the 
installation and subsequent monitoring extend beyond a simple 
search at the border in question.311 Therefore, the GPS tracking 
device should not be considered merely in the vehicular context at 
the border. 
Flores-Montano also mentions instances where “some 
searches of property are so destructive” or “particularly offensive,” 
to require particularized suspicion.312 The definition of an 
“offensive” search remains an open question for courts.313 Because 
this Note focuses on installation of a GPS device and the 
subsequent tracking, which creates limited-to-no damage to a 
vehicle’s safety or operability due to installation and placement 
practices to date,314 no further analysis of Flores-Montano follows. 
 
 308.  See Santana, Almeida-Sanchez, supra note 123, at 238 n.149 and 
accompanying text; see also Amended Order, supra note 12, at 7 (discussing how 
a GPS goes beyond the border search’s permissible scope); see also 
Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 149 (reiterating that “this Court has long recognized 
that automobiles seeking entry into this country may be searched,” so the 
defendant did not have possessory interest in his gas tank which is a piece of the 
automobile itself). If no consent is given to take apart the fuel tank, given the fact 
that the disassembly takes place at the border, this differentiates the disassembly 
from the installation and subsequent surveillance using a GPS tracking device 
because an individual’s expectation of privacy heightens as he or she leaves the 
border. Border Searches and the Fourth Amendment, supra note 146, at 1012.  
 309.  See Santana, Almeida-Sanchez, supra note 123, at 238 n.149 (discussing 
implicit consent and notice associated with the border). 
 310.  See Amended Order, supra note 12, at 7 (noting that the GPS installation 
is a search that “stretches far beyond the conduct of the border to create a ‘precise 
comprehensive record of a person’s movements’”). 
 311.  See id. at 6–8 (discussing the installation of the GPS device and 
subsequent monitoring in the context of Flores-Montano, Jones, and Carpenter).  
 312.  United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 154 n.2, 156 (2004). 
 313.  See Amended Order, supra note 12, at 5–6 (highlighting this open 
question and how the Ninth Circuit has chosen to handle the question but not 
utilize it). 
 314.  See id. at 5 (determining that it was the “unceasing search that precludes 
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The analysis thus moves to whether a GPS device should fall under 
the routine and non-routine search instead. 
a. Routine Searches 
If courts analyze the installation of a GPS tracking device 
under both the routine and non-routine search distinction using 
the Jones distinction, then the Border Search Doctrine should not 
apply.315 Unlike a routine search, the attachment of a GPS 
tracking device is not like a pat-down or the removal of outer 
garments.316 Each of the aforementioned limits the degree of 
intrusiveness to the individual in question.317 The individual 
receives notice of the search, can identify the searched item, and 
understands the full scope of the routine search prior to the 
intrusion.318 A GPS tracking device, in contrast, intrudes on an 
individual’s privacy without consent, neglects to provide notice, 
and reveals more about an individual than a simple routine 
search.319  
 
application of the extended border search doctrine”); see also GPS & Video 
Installation General concepts and installation techniques, FLEETISTICS, 
https://www.fleetistics.com/resources/training/gps-installations/ (last visited Feb. 
17, 2020) (discussing various GPS installation concepts and providing tutorials 
for installation) [perma.cc/VKU5-4UPR].  
 315.  See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 618–19 (1977) (discussing 
routine searches); see also United States v. Johnson, 991 F.2d 1287, 1291 (7th Cir. 
1993) (highlighting the lower degree of privacy invasion from routine searches); 
see also United States v. Sandler, 644 F.2d 1163, 1169 (5th Cir. 1981) (noting that 
pat-down and frisks are routine searches); see also United States v. Jones, 565 
U.S. 400, 408 (2012) (concluding that the intrusion on property constituted a 
search).  
 316.  See supra notes 125–128 and accompanying text (commenting on the 
nature of “routine searches”); see also Amended Order, supra note 12, at 7–8 
(discussing the intrusiveness of GPS tracking and how it fits into the Border 
Search Doctrine and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence). 
 317.  See supra notes 125–128 and accompanying text.  
 318.  See supra notes 125–128 and accompanying text. 
 319.  See Jones, 565 U.S. at 404–05, 411–12 (describing the problematic nature 
of GPS monitoring); see also id. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring) (discussing how “the 
use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigations . . . impinges on expectations 
of privacy”); see also Amended Order, supra note 12, at 7 (noting that 
“[s]urreptitious surveillance of an individual’s movements through placement of 
a GPS device on a vehicle implicates far greater privacy concerns than the 
physical integrity of the vehicle”).  
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While an individual can reasonably expect to undergo a 
routine search upon returning to the border, individuals do not 
have a reasonable expectation of governmental intrusion to their 
privacy interests through the installation of a GPS tracking device 
at the border.320 The intrusion differs between the two because a 
routine search is a direct examination of the items or individual at 
the border in question.321 In contrast,322 using a GPS device reveals 
no information about the individual at the border and merely 
intrudes on the privacy interests of an individual after crossing.323 
While routine searches do not require a reasonable suspicion prior 
to inspection, the installation of a GPS tracking device at the 
border should not fall under a routine search because the intrusion 
lies in the information gathered away from the border.324 Because 
of the heightened degree of intrusiveness and the lack of an actual 
search at the border, the Border Search Doctrine should not apply 
to the installation of a GPS tracking device under a routine 
search.325 
b. Non-Routine Searches 
While a GPS tracking device goes beyond a limited intrusion 
on an individual, by intruding on the privacy interests of an 
individual’s vehicle and movements, it remains distinguishable 
 
 320.  See PS Rosenzweig, Functional Equivalent, supra note 122, at 1133 
(explaining how notice is provided at a recognized border and individuals thus 
have a lower expectation of privacy); Santana, Almeida-Sanchez, supra note 123, 
at 238 (highlighting the implicit consent individuals provide to law enforcement 
at the border); Border Searches and the Fourth Amendment, supra note 146, at 
1012.  
 321.  See KIM, PROTECTING THE U.S. PERIMETER, supra note 28 (differentiating 
routine from non-routine searches, where non-routine includes “strip searches,” 
“prolonged detentions,” and others).  
 322.  See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–11 (2012) (concluding that 
the installation of a GPS violates property interests). 
 323.  See United States v. Johnson, 991 F.2d 1287, 1291 (7th Cir. 1993) 
(mentioning that non-routine searches require reasonable suspicion while routine 
do not); see also Amended Order, supra note 12, at 7 (deciding the “placement of 
a GPS device at the border necessarily implicates a search away from the border, 
once the target has gained entry into the country”).  
 324.  See Amended Order, supra note 12, at 7 (holding the surreptitious 
surveillance away from the border to result in the border exception not applying). 
 325.  See supra notes 315–324 and accompanying text.  
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from a non-routine search.326 A non-routine search primarily 
focuses on the individual in the context of a strip search, body 
cavity search, or some x-ray searches.327 The disclosure of 
information or contraband is a result of an intrusion on an 
individual’s personal well-being and space at the border based on 
reasonable suspicion.328 The installation of a GPS tracking device, 
in contrast, focuses on the disclosure of information obtained away 
from the border and is more intrusive.329 While the information 
gathered pertains to the individual driving the vehicle, the 
information is not readily disclosed at the border and needs to be 
accumulated.330 The information gathered from a non-routine 
searched is limited to a person and a specific moment in time.331 
Whereas the information from the GPS tracking device extends to 
a person’s habits and locational privacy as a whole.332 
Consequently, the installation of a GPS tracking device defies both 
categories of searches.333  
Similar to the court’s reasoning in Ignjatov, “[A]n analysis 
dependent on the physical aspects of the search [is not] appropriate 
here where the search extends beyond the installation of the GPS 
device [at the border].”334 As such, the Border Search Doctrine 
should not be applied to the installation and subsequent 
monitoring of a GPS tracking device at the border. 
 
 326.  See Jones, 565 U.S. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (discussing how 
surveillance techniques evade ordinary checks that constrain law enforcement 
and chills expressive freedoms).  
 327.  See Kim, PROTECTING THE U.S. PERIMETER, supra note 28 (describing 
non-routine searches to include strip searches, body cavity searches, and some 
x-ray searches). 
 328.  See id. (noting how non-routine searches require reasonable suspicion at 
the time of crossing the border). 
 329.  See Amended Order, supra note 12, at 7 (stating that the GPS conducts 
a search that “stresses far beyond the conduct of the border”). 
 330.  See id. (mentioning that the information obtained from the border 
provides a “precise comprehensive record of a person’s public movements”); see 
also United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 430 (Alito, J., concurring) (describing 
how long term GPS usage is not a societal expectation). 
 331.  See Kim, PROTECTING THE U.S. PERIMETER, supra note 28 (discussing 
non-routine searches to include strip searches, body cavity searches, and some 
x-ray searches).  
 332.  See supra note 329 and accompanying text.  
 333.  See supra notes 326–332 and accompanying text.  
 334.  Amended Order, supra note 12, at 6. 
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c. Extended Border Search and the Fourth Amendment 
As the individual in a vehicle moves away from the border 
after the installation of the GPS device, the Extended Border 
Search, albeit hazier in application, should not apply.335  
While the initial placement of the GPS tracking device occurs 
at the border, the subsequent monitoring is invasive regardless of 
the duration.336 Unlike Jones, where the installation of the GPS 
and its use to obtain information are treated as a singular act that 
constitutes a search,337 this continuous monitoring is an extended 
search.338 While Jones did not delineate whether tracking alone 
constituted a search, Carpenter bridges this gap.339 Because 
tracking can provide the “Government near perfect surveillance,” 
which goes against an “individual’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy as to their whole physical movements,” subsequent 
tracking, though limited to CSLI, violates the Fourth 
Amendment.340 “[T]he use of longer term GPS monitoring in 
investigations . . . impinges on expectations of privacy”341 because 
it “evades the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law 
enforcement practices.”342 A GPS device allows government agents 
to track and monitor an individual’s location information for an 
extended period of time.343 Although the extended border cases 
 
 335.  See infra text accompanying notes 336–352. 
 336.  See Amended Order, supra note 12, at 8 (discussing the surreptitious 
surveillance after installation). 
 337.  United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–05, 411–12 (2012). 
 338.  See Amended Order, supra note 12, at 8 (noting that even though “the 
initial placement of the GPS device[] . . . occurred at the border, the subsequent 
monitoring of data . . . constitutes a continuous search”).  
 339.  See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2210, 2217 (2018) 
(concluding that seven days of surveillance data to be a search and GPS data to 
be quite similar to the CSLI obtained).  
 340.  See id. at 2217–19 (identifying the similarities between CSLI and GPS 
even though the Court limited the holding to matters before the Court). 
 341.  Jones, 565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring).  
 342.  Id. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
 343.  Id. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring) (discussing the duration of tracking); see 
Amended Order, supra note 12, at 2–3, 8 (mentioning the installed program’s 
tracking capabilities). While it can be argued that the police merely checked the 
individual’s location infrequently, this fails to recognize that the locational 
information recorded pertains to an individual’s complete movements during a 
specific period of time. Amended Order, supra note 12, at 2–3, 8. 
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typically involve the physical surveillance of a vehicle after 
crossing the border, the reasonableness lies in the fact that the 
subsequent monitoring is in an effort to seize contraband from 
within the vehicle itself.344 This clashes in the GPS tracking device 
framework because the installation and subsequent monitoring 
are not limited to obtaining tangible information regarding the 
vehicle or items therein, near or at the border, but rather some 
intangible misconduct away from the border and outside of the 
vehicle setting.345 This differs from a gas tank disassembly or an 
individual x-ray because taking apart a gas tank or taking an x-ray 
of an individual focus on tangible items present within the object 
or on the individual at the time of the border crossing.346 The 
attachment of a GPS tracking device constitutes a search that 
exceeds the time of border crossing because it looks to search an 
intangible element of an individual, either his future location or 
the entirety of his or her future movements, for an extended period 
of time.347 This is especially the case when the tracking program 
permits the government agents to not only view the locational 
information for a specific moment but to also download all historic 
location information from the devices installed.348 This type of 
monitoring impinges on an individual’s expectation of privacy and 
may “chill associational and expressive freedoms.”349 “Such 
tracking is poles apart from the discrete searches conducted under 
the extended border search doctrine,”350 and thus should not be 
classified as an extended border search.351  
 
 344.  See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 149 (2004) 
(discussing this grant of authority to border agents by Congress as a duty to 
“prevent the introduction of contraband into this country”).  
 345.  See Amended Order, supra note 12, at 8 (mentioning how law 
enforcement can download the historic location data which is “poles apart from 
discrete searches conducted under the extended border doctrine”).  
 346.  See supra notes 126–127 and accompanying text.  
 347.  See Amended Order, supra note 12, at 2–3, 7–8 (analyzing the GPS 
installation under the Border Search and Extended Border Search Doctrine and 
concluding that the defendants’ motion to suppress should be granted).  
 348.  See id. at 2–5, 8 (providing details for the program, Covert Tracker). 
 349.  United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 413–18 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring).  
 350.  Amended Order, supra note 12, at 8.  
 351.  Id. If the attachment of the GPS tracking device is for finding 
contraband, this still constitutes a search because the installation is a trespass 
on an individual’s property. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–05 (2012). 
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Furthermore, travelers do not have notice of a search of this 
nature.352 While specific checkpoints of entry can in theory put 
travelers on notice that searches are likely to be made, this 
expectation diminishes at “distant border equivalents [that] have 
no international status.”353 While the initial search occurs at the 
border and continues on a public roadway, a traveler “has regained 
an expectation of privacy” once he or she clears the border.354 An 
individual typically regains possession of his vehicle after the 
installation of a GPS tracking device because law enforcement 
officers want to monitor the individual away from the border.355 
The surreptitious installation of the GPS tracker thus constitutes 
a physical trespass without notice or consent and cannot be 
classified as an extended border search.356 Physical surveillance 
contrasts from GPS monitoring because no intrusion into the 
physical domain of an individual occurs in the former,357 while the 
 
Even if the contraband is in the vehicle near the border, courts have found that 
distance to the border is not enough in itself to validate a search and requires 
reasonable suspicion. United States v. Rangel-Partillo, 586 F.3d 376, 376 (5th Cir. 
2009). If the contraband is not located at the border at the time of crossing, then 
it similarly should not fall under the Border Search Doctrine, for distance to the 
border alone is not enough. Id. If agents are unable to determine whether or not 
the Border Search Doctrine applies, when dealing with the possible presence of 
contraband, then as Justice Alito posited in Jones, “police may always seek a 
warrant” if uncertain “whether a certain period of GPS surveillance is long 
enough to constitute a Fourth Amendment Search. Jones, 565 U.S. at 430–31 
(Alito, J., concurring). 
 352.  See PS Rosenzweig, Functional Equivalent, supra note 122, at 1133 
(discussing how travelers are implicitly put on notice because of the presence of a 
border); see also Santana, Almeida-Sanchez, supra note 123, at 238 (discussing 
how an individual’s lowered expectation of privacy at the border increases as they 
get farther from the border). 
 353.  PS Rosenzweig, Functional Equivalent, supra note 122, at 1133. 
 354.  United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 961–62 (9th Cir.) (en banc), 
cert. denied, 571 U.S. 1156 (2014) (delineating between an individual regaining 
his expectation of privacy versus Cotterman, who never regained his laptop 
because it did not clear the border). 
 355.  See Amended Order, supra note 12, at 2–5, 8 (discussing the information 
gained after installation).  
 356.  See id. at 2–5, 7–8 (concluding that prolonged surveillance could not be 
classified as either a border search or an extended border search).  
 357.  See id. at 7 (describing how “[w]hile the placement of a GPS device on a 
vehicle falls short of an intrusion ‘akin to reading a diary line by line’ . . . data 
collection inherent in GPS monitoring exceeds suspicionless searches authorized 
in the border vehicle cases”); see also Santana, Almeida-Sanchez, supra note 123, 
at 238 (discussing implicit consent in border search cases).  
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government in the latter scenario “trespassorily insert[s] the 
information-gathering device” to the privacy property of an 
individual.358 Travelers, for this reason, do not have notice that 
they may be subjected to a search of this nature. 
d. GPS Devices and Current Policies 
This Note discussed two border policies known to date.359 If 
courts analyze the existing border policies in conjunction with the 
installation of a GPS tracking device, the Border Search Doctrine 
should not apply. The CBP Border policy distinguishes electronic 
searches at the border to be either “basic” or “advanced” and 
assigns a level of suspicion dependent on the type of search labeled 
by the government.360 The DHS GPS Policy appears to mold a 
framework between existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
and the Border Search Doctrine.361  
The CBP Border policy is meant for electronic devices acquired 
at the border upon entry or departure.362 It however is not 
applicable to the vehicle context.363 This is because the installation 
of the GPS device and subsequent monitoring is not a stationary 
search at the border like an electronic device.364 While the GPS 
device could be considered external equipment used by border 
agents to “review, copy, and/or analyze [the vehicle’s] contents,”365 
 
 358.  United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 408–11 (2012).  
 359.  See U.S. Customs and Border Protection 2018, supra note 189 (outlining 
the current policy for electronic devices); see also Allen Declaration, supra note 
17, at 1–3 (describing the policy and authority behind the 48-hour policy law 
enforcement utilized to justify the installation in Ignjatov).  
 360.  See U.S. Customs and Border Protection 2018, supra note 189 
(categorizing the search and outlining the differences).  
 361.  See Allen Declaration, supra note 17, at 1–3 (describing the policy’s 
authority). 
 362.  See U.S. Customs and Border Protection 2018, supra note 189 (listing 
the subject of the guideline to be “border search of electronic devices”). 
 363.  See id. (naming the purpose to be providing guidance “in computers, 
tablets, removable disks, drives, tapes, mobile phones, cameras, music and other 
media players, and any other communication, electronic, or digital devices subject 
to inbound and outbound border searches”). 
 364.  See Amended Order, supra note 12, at 7 (concluding the search extended 
beyond the border). 
 365.  See U.S. Customs and Border Protection 2018, supra note 189 (covering 
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the analysis is not complete at the border and the individual is not 
notified of the advanced search.366 Moreover, the vehicle is merely 
a conduit for the physical movements of an individual rather than 
the actual item examined.367 This does not mean that the vehicle 
itself or the individual should not be subject to a search at the 
border.368 Instead, because the information sought from the 
installation of a GPS device does not pertain to the vehicle but 
rather the individual’s movements and possible unconfirmed 
misconduct away from the border, this border policy should not 
apply to GPS tracking devices.369 
The DHS GPS Policy from Ignjatov is more difficult to explain, 
given the lack of information in the factual record.370 However, 
based on the facts known, a court would not find the border policy 
to be valid under the Border Search Doctrine or Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence. HSI bases its border policy on the 
belief that it successfully merges the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Jones and Flores-Montano with the Border Search Doctrine.371 
Nevertheless, a clear disparity exists between the three. 
The first divergence is the fact that the Border Search 
Doctrine and Flores-Montano focus on searches of an individual 
and vehicles at the border.372 While the extended border doctrine 
examines a secondary search away from the border, that search is 
clearly delineated and focused on a particular item, like electronic 
devices or a vehicle.373 Jones treats the GPS installation and 
 
the scope of the search of an electronic device). 
 366.  See Amended Order, supra note 12, at 7 (discussing how “the concerns 
animating the border search doctrine, namely the integrity of the border, 
diminish, and the robust Fourth Amendment requirements adhere” once the 
search extends beyond the border continuously in duration).  
 367.  See id. at 2–3, 7–8 (highlighting the tracking program and its ability to 
trace the individual for a set interval, which law enforcement agents determined).  
 368.  See id. at 7–8 (describing how it is the extensive and intrusive nature of 
the search that makes a GPS tracking device problematic). 
 369.  See U.S. Customs and Border Protection 2018, supra note 189 (providing 
a list of items it governs and vehicles are not one of them).  
 370.  See Allen Declaration, supra note 17, at 1–3 (discussing the only facts 
known about the 48-hour policy).  
 371.  See id. at 1–3 (listing the authorities the 48-hour policy is based on).  
 372.  See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 149 (2004) 
(discussing a vehicle search at the border); see supra notes 116–139 and 
accompanying text. 
 373.  See supra notes 140–170 and accompanying text. 
214 27 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 161 (2020) 
subsequent use to track a vehicle as a singular act.374 While Jones 
did not determine whether tracking alone constituted a search, 
Carpenter determined that acquiring location information for 
seven days violates the Fourth Amendment because “individuals 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of their 
physical movements.”375 Tying the two concepts together, the 
Supreme Court in Carpenter appears to extend Jones to include 
tracking as a search under the Fourth Amendment.376  
 As such, the installation of the GPS device and subsequent 
monitoring do not fit clearly within the Border Search Doctrine or 
Flores-Montano.377 This is because the installation of a GPS 
tracking device and its subsequent surveillance are a continuous 
search away from the border.378 The search is not stationary like 
that of a traditional border search or the vehicle search in 
Flores-Montano.379 The device, instead, not only offers real-time 
locational data, but it also records and stores these data for others 
to examine at a later time.380 Because officials can alter the amount 
of data acquired from the device, the GPS tracking device is an 
extension of a traditional search and occurs outside of the border 
region.381 Following Carpenter, because individuals have an 
expectation of privacy in the whole of their movements,382 this 
continuous monitoring is a search under the Fourth 
 
 374.  United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–05, 411–12 (2012) (holding 
“that the Government's installation of a GPS device on a target's vehicle, and its 
use of that device to monitor the vehicle's movements, constitutes a ‘search’”). 
 375.  Carpenter v. United States 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213–20 (2018). 
 376.  See Jones, 565 U.S. at 404–05, 411–12 (discussing the intrusion to 
property from the installation); see also Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213–20 
(describing how surveillance is a search because individual’s have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the whole of their movements). 
 377.  See supra notes 371–376 and accompanying text.  
 378.  See Amended Order, supra note 12, at 7–8 (discussing the problematic 
nature of the GPS installation and subsequent monitoring). 
 379.   See id. at 7–8, 15 (mentioning Flores-Montano and unwilling to find GPS 
installation and subsequent monitoring to be on the same foot).  
 380.  See Amended Order, supra note 12, at 2–3 (discussing the program’s 
tracking capabilities). 
 381.  See id. at 2–3, 7–8 (mentioning the changes in tracking intervals and 
continuous search). 
 382.  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213–20 (holding that “an individual maintains 
a legitimate expectation of privacy in the record of his physical movements as 
captured through CSLI”). 
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Amendment.383 This falls outside of the Border Search Doctrine, 
the extended border search, and Flores-Montano’s sphere of 
influence.384  
Jones does not rectify this conundrum because the Court 
focused on the installation and its use which intruded on the 
individual’s property and privacy.385 Jones did not focus on the 
vehicle alone or the fact that the individual was driving on public 
roadways.386 Instead, the Court zeroed in on the intrusion caused 
by the installation of the device.387 The intrusion into the private 
property of an individual and his or her movements became the 
ultimate problem.388 As such, analyzing the installation of a GPS 
device and its subsequent tracking solely under a vehicle search 
context under the Border Search Doctrine or Flores-Montano is an 
insufficient justification for the border policy.389  
Furthermore, based on the three authorities presented, it is 
unclear as to which doctrine governs once an individual clears the 
border.390 Utilizing only the three authorities presented, if Jones 
takes over immediately after clearing the border, then the 
installation of the device is a search under the Fourth 
Amendment.391 This is because the majority in Jones focused on 
the intrusion to the individual rather than ongoing tracking.392 
Therefore, the installation itself, which is a trespass on an 
individual’s property, controls393 and lacks support as a border 
policy by Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  
 
 383.  See Amended Order, supra note 12, at 7–8 (refusing to allow continuous 
tracking to fall under the border search exception).  
 384.  See supra notes 372–383 and accompanying text. 
 385.  See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 404, 404–05, 411–12 (2012) 
(applying the common-law of trespass). 
 386.  Id.  
 387.  Id.  
 388.  See id. at 404–05, 408–12 (describing the physical intrusion to property). 
 389.  See supra notes 372–388 and accompanying text. 
 390.  See Allen Declaration, supra note 17, at 1–3 (discussing the only known 
facts of the policy).  
 391.  See Jones, 565 U.S. at 400, 410–11 (determining the GPS installation to 
be a search because it trespassed into the individual’s property).  
 392.  Id. at 409–12 (noting that by physically attaching a device to Jones’ Jeep, 
“officers encroached on a protected area”). 
 393.  Id. at 404–05, 411–12 (noting that intrusion in the form of the 
government physically occupying private property would have been considered a 
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The Border Search Doctrine and Flores-Montano should not 
apply to the GPS installation once an individual clears the 
border.394 Flores-Montano concerns a stationary search of a vehicle 
at the border,395 while the Border Search Doctrine concerns 
searching an individual, vehicle, or item at or near the border.396 
Whereas, the installation of a GPS device obtains information 
outside of the vehicle context for misconduct away from the 
border.397 
If the policy allows for authorities outside of the three listed, 
then Carpenter should apply.398 Carpenter focused on the tracking 
itself and determined that “individuals [have a] reasonable 
expectation of privacy as to their whole physical movements.”399 
Because the tracking showcased an “exhaustive chronicle of 
location information,” the Court determined that seven days of 
historical CSLI data constituted a search.400 Accordingly, even if 
an individual clears the border and reacquires a heightened 
expectation of privacy while traversing on a public roadway, the 
subsequent tracking, regardless of the installation, is a search 
because of the intrusion on an individual’s movements.401 Based on 
this line of reasoning, regardless of the authorities used, the border 
policy is a search under the Fourth Amendment based on the 
reasoning in Jones and Carpenter.402 
While the border policy states that it allows for “limit[ed] 
warrantless GPS monitoring to 48 hours, with the exception of 
airplanes, commercial vehicles, and semi-tractor 
 
‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted”).  
 394.  See discussion supra Section II.B.  
 395.  See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 149 (2004) (outlining 
the facts to the case).  
 396.  See discussion supra Section II.B. 
 397.  See Amended Order, supra note 12, at 7 (discussing the information 
acquired and search). 
 398.  See discussion supra Section II.B. 
 399.  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2210, 2217 (2018). 
 400.  Id. at 2219–20. 
 401.  See id. at 2210, 2217, 2219–20 (discussing the ramifications of 
surveillance of this nature and how it goes against an individual’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the whole of their movements); see also United States v. 
Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 411–12 (2012) (disregarding the fact that the vehicle 
traversed on public roadways). 
 402.  See supra notes 399–401 and accompanying text. 
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trailers . . . [because they] have a significantly reduced expectation 
of privacy in the location of their vehicles,”403 existing precedent 
and literature do not substantiate this claim. While Knotts and 
Karo establish a diminished expectation of privacy on public 
roadways, they did not explicitly distinguish specific privacy 
interests based on the vehicles on the road or apply their reasoning 
to the border.404 Similarly, Jones did not establish a reduced 
expectation of privacy based on the vehicle driven.405 Instead, 
Jones focused on the intrusion to privacy interests and property.406 
It is thus unclear why those particular vehicles have a reduced 
expectation of privacy in their locations.407  
While Jones did not explicitly pinpoint a timeframe of constant 
surveillance to constitute a search, both concurrences took a firmer 
stance, which Carpenter endorsed,408 for Carpenter concluded that 
seven days of historical CSLI data represented a search.409  
While Carpenter was a narrow ruling focusing only on the 
matters before the Court, the logic behind the ruling stands.410 
Surveillance data offers “an intimate window into a person’s life, 
revealing not only his particular movements, but through them his 
‘familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual 
 
 403.  Allen Declaration, supra note 17, at 1–3. 
 404.  See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 276, 286 (1983) (finding no 
violation from the tracking and surveillance); see also United States v. Karo, 468 
U.S. 705, 706 (1984) (concluding no violation under the Katz test, even though 
container contained a beeper). 
 405.  See Jones, 565 U.S. at 401, 404–05, 408–12 (determining that the 
trespass on the vehicle is why the installation of a GPS device violates the Fourth 
Amendment). 
 406.  See id. at 408–12 (utilizing common-law trespass rather than Katz to find 
the installation to be a search). 
 407.  See supra notes 403–406 and accompanying text. 
 408.  See Jones, 565 U.S. at 413–19 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (determining 
that surveillance of this nature “chills associational and expressive freedoms”); 
see also Jones, 565 U.S. at 419–31 (Alito, J., concurring) (describing that 
long-term GPS surveillance is a search, like the four weeks utilized in Jones); see 
also Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2206–08 (recognizing individuals have a reasonable 
expectation in the whole of their movements).  
 409.  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2210, 2214–19 (2018) 
(holding that “an individual maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the 
record of his physical movements as captured through CSLI”). 
 410.  See id. at 2217–19 (describing how the holding did not extend past the 
matter before the Court). 
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associations.’”411 Monitoring is “remarkably easy, cheap, and 
efficient compared to traditional tools . . . [and] [w]ith just the click 
of a button, the Government can access . . . [a] repository of 
historical location information at practically no expense.”412 This 
type of “retrospective quality of data [] gives police access to a 
category of information otherwise unknowable,” and gathered 
without consent.413 Forty-eight hours may seem like a brief 
duration, but dependent on the speed, an individual could travel a 
distance of over 3000 miles.414 This is almost thirty times the 
reasonable distance defined by statutory authority.415 This is an 
expansive period of time for law enforcement to gather continuous 
“near perfect surveillance”416 and impinges on an individual’s 
expectation of privacy.417 To put it into perspective, it takes 
thirty-nine hours to travel from California to Virginia, which are 
2,646 miles apart.418 A disconnect thus exists between the level of 
authority defined by federal statute and DHS GPS Policy. An 
individual’s movements during this time frame of forty-eight hours 
would provide an intimate look into an individual’s life, and “[s]uch 
a chronicle implicates privacy concerns far beyond those 
considered” in Carpenter.419 The forty-eight-hour exception 
 
 411.  Id. at 2217; Jones, 565 U.S. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
 412.  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217–18.  
 413.  Id. at 2218.  
 414.  See Unit 18 Section 2:  Calculating speed, distance and time, CENTRE FOR 
INNOVATION IN MATHEMATICS TEACHING, 
https://www.cimt.org.uk/projects/mepres/book8/bk8i18/bk8_18i2.htm (last visited 
Feb. 14, 2020) (calculating distance by multiplying the amount of time with the 
speed and if an individual is going 65mph for 48 hours, they can traverse over 
3000 miles) [perma.cc/SSV8-KBJV].  
 415.  See 8 C.F.R. § 287.1(b) (2018) (defining “reasonable distance”).  
 416.  See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2210, 2217–19 (recognizing the privacy 
interests of individuals against intrusive law enforcement techniques). 
 417.  See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 430 (2012) (Alito, J., 
concurring) (commenting on why long-term surveillance is more detrimental than 
short-term surveillance).  
 418.  Driving Directions from California to Virginia, GOOGLE MAPS, 
http://maps.google.com (last visited Sept. 20, 2020) (follow “Directions” hyperlink; 
then searching starting point field for “California” and search destination field for 
“Virginia”) [perma.cc/6KEP-LZ72]. 
 419.  See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219–20 (2018) 
(discussing why surveillance of this nature is problematic). 
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summarized in the border policy is thus a search under the Fourth 
Amendment, even with the limited facts known at this time.420  
Limitations accordingly exist to the Border Search Doctrine, 
regardless of the controversial policies in existence.421 As dictated 
by the court in Ignjatov, “Once the entity at issue is beyond the 
border, the concerns animating the border search doctrine, namely 
the integrity of the border, diminish, and the robust Fourth 
Amendment requirements adhere.”422 It thus follows, based on 
Jones and Carpenter, that the installation of a GPS tracking device 
is a search under the Fourth Amendment that is not subject to the 
border search exception.423 
V. Transparency and Accountability:  Why Courts Matter 
While a great deal of overlap exists between the Fourth 
Amendment and the Border Search Doctrine, one must ultimately 
yield, as seen in Ignjatov and described above.424 However, an 
impediment remains:  A lack of transparency persists for policies 
along the border. While the EFF and DHS continue their ongoing 
litigation, privacy interests are at an impasse.425 This is 
problematic because obscure policies diminish an individual’s trust 
in the governing system, which weakens governmental authority 
thereby diminishing the foundation of a legitimate democratic 
government.426 While Jones and Alasaad serve as a barrier of sorts 
 
 420.  See Gruel Declaration, supra note 10, at 1–4 (explaining during sixteen 
years as an AUSA and ten years as Chief of the General Crimes Section, neither 
he nor anyone asked had heard of “a border exception permitting . . . warrantless 
installation of . . . GPS tracking device[s] or some sort of 48 hour-rule,” or “this 
‘48 hour rule’ or the ‘commercial vehicle exception’”).  
 421.  See discussion supra Section II.B.  
 422.  Amended Order, supra note 12, at 7.  
 423.  See discussion supra Sections III.A–B, IV.A–B.  
 424.  See discussion supra Sections III.A–B.  
 425.  See EFF Order, supra note 22 (laying out a schedule through February 
11, 2021). 
 426.  See Eric E. Citron, Right and Responsibility in Fourth Amendment 
Jurisprudence:  The Problem with Pretext, 116 YALE L. J. 1072, 1104–106 (2007) 
(arguing that a relationship between citizenry and the “power of the state and its 
police force” is “one of trust” for “a fiduciary duty [] runs from the police to the 
citizenry that granted them their unique powers in the first place”).  
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for privacy interests,427 policy transparency in congruence with 
established precedent is necessary to ensure the privacy rights of 
both citizens and noncitizens alike. 
 An individual has “full protection in person and in property,” 
which is “a principle as old as the common law.”428 Political, social, 
and economic changes, however, result in the “recognition of new 
rights, and the common law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet the 
demands of society.”429 On a foundational level, individuals have a 
baseline regarding privacy.430 This includes a “right to be left 
alone.”431 The Fourth Amendment developed “upon the idea that 
integral to the Constitution and our societal view of government is 
a reciprocal trust between the government and its citizens.”432 
“This mandate from the citizenry legitimatizes government action; 
however, only if the citizenry’s decision itself is an informed and 
free choice such that the government can claim that it has true 
consent of the governed.”433 Achievement of this mandate can only 
be done if the government “does not imperil the citizenry’s ability 
to give its consent in an informed and free manner.”434 However, 
the advancements of technology fragment these expectations and 
 
 427.  See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 400 (2012) (holding that the 
installation of a GPS device violates the Fourth Amendment); see also Alasaad 
Order, supra note 202 (determining that reasonable suspicion is required for both 
a basic and advanced search at the border for electronic devices).  
 428.  See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 
HARVARD L. REV. 193, 193 (1890) [hereinafter Warren & Brandeis, Right to 
Privacy] (protesting against the intrusive activities of the journalists in those 
days and suggesting individuals maintain privacy even against those activities).  
 429.  Id.  
 430.  Id. at 198 (stating that “[t]he common law secures to each individual the 
right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and 
emotions shall be communicated to others”). 
 431.  Id. at 193–94; see also Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 136–37 
(1942) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that “the Fourth Amendment puts 
a restraint on the arm of the government and prevents it from invading the 
sanctity of a man’s home or his private quarters . . . to prevent oppression and 
abuse of authority”).  
 432.  Scott E. Sundby, Everyone’s Fourth Amendment:  Privacy or Mutual 
Trust between Government and Citizen, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1777 (1994) 
[hereinafter Sundby, Everyone’s Fourth]; see also, id. at 1771 (discussing trust as 
a constitutional value). 
 433.  Id.  
 434.  Id.  
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jeopardize this underlying trust.435 “The Fourth Amendment as a 
privacy-focused doctrine has not fared well with the changing time 
of an increasingly non-private world and a judicial reluctance to 
expand individual rights.”436 “The problem [is that] privacy in new 
technologies ‘is usually complex.’”437 “Developments such as 
growing government regulation and expanding technological 
capacity [] have robbed the ‘right to be left alone.’”438 “The result is 
a complex and often-fluctuating relationship between surveillance 
and privacy.”439 This is because technological change can result in 
“preexisting forms of surveillance [becoming] more intrusive” or 
the opposite effect, which upsets both law enforcement’s 
interpretation and privacy interests.440  
Fourth Amendment precedent currently “frames the issue as 
a binary choice between the antagonistic interests—the 
government’s law enforcement needs and the individual’s privacy 
interest.”441 “Rights [however] are not simply enclaves of protection 
from government interference but also affect the citizen’s view of 
his or her role in society.”442 To put it in simpler terms, rights help 
frame an individual’s reasonable expectation of his or her own 
privacy interests, and in the Fourth Amendment context, this can 
heavily influence whether a government intrusion constitutes a 
search.443 It is therefore important to understand both the 
technological innovation and the ultimate policies established in 
 
 435.  See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies, 102 
MICH. L. REV. 801, 859 (2004) [hereinafter Kerr, The Fourth Amendment] 
(discussing ramification of new technology).  
 436.  Sundby, Everyone’s Fourth, supra note 432, at 1771.  
 437.  Kerr, The Fourth Amendment, supra note 435, at 877; see also Stephen 
Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245, 262 (2002) (noting 
the complexities of establishing law involving changing technologies and public 
perceptions, while “balancing [the] value in light of predictions about the 
technological future”).  
 438.  Sundby, Everyone’s Fourth, supra note 432, at 1777 (noting the decline 
of privacy rights when there is a lack of accountability).  
 439.  Kerr, The Fourth Amendment, supra note 435, at 859.  
 440.  Id. at 865. 
 441.  See Sundby, Everyone’s Fourth, supra note 432, at 1784 (highlighting a 
deficiency in current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence). 
 442.  Id.  
 443.  See discussion supra Sections II.A–B. 
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conjunction with them to promote trust and accountability 
between the citizenry and government.444  
“An implicit linkage between privacy and visibility is deeply 
embedded in privacy doctrine.”445 Some privacy skeptics argue that 
“information conveyed by most individual items of personal data is 
too banal to trigger privacy interest.”446 Yet, transparency and 
accountability work hand-in-hand.447 “Transparency alters the 
parameters of evolving subjectivity [of spaces and places whereas 
surveillance] exposure alters the capacity of places to function as 
contexts within which identity is developed and performed.”448 
Technology, however, should not be solely blamed for “this broken 
link between transparency and public accountability.”449 Instead, 
Professor Shkabatur argues that this discrepancy is due to 
agencies being able to “retain control over regulatory data and thus 
withhold information that is essential for public accountability 
purposes.”450 Consequently, “transparency policies—and not only 
their rhetoric—should focus on accountability related 
information.”451 
To do this, Professor Shkabatur proposes requiring “agencies 
to explain and justify their decisions” outside of the notice and 
comment period, instead of “letting agencies disclose whatever 
data they choose.”452 A requirement of this nature is necessary 
 
 444.  See Jennifer Shkabatur, Transparency With(out) Accountability:  Open 
Government in the United States, 31 YALE L. & POLICY REV. 79, 79–80 (2012) 
[hereinafter Shkabatur, Transparency With(out) Accountability] (evaluating 
online transparency and agency accountability).  
 445.  Julie E. Cohen, Privacy, Visibility, Transparency, and Exposure, 75 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 181, 182 (2008) [hereinafter Cohen, Privacy] (discussing how privacy 
and visibility go hand-in-hand).  
 446.  See id. at 183 (describing the evolution of the privacy doctrine).  
 447.  See Shkabatur, Transparency With(out) Accountability, supra note 444, 
at 119 (highlighting why transparency is important with technological 
advancement). 
 448.  See Cohen, Privacy, supra note 445, at 194 (highlighting the 
complementary effects of exposure and transparency).  
 449.  See Shkabatur, Transparency With(out) Accountability, supra note 444, 
at 81 (outlining the argument for the article).  
 450.  Id.  
 451.  Id.  
 452.  Id. at 120; see also Christopher Slobogin, Policing As Administration, 165 
U. PENN. L. REV. 1, 1 (2016) (advocating for “[p]olice agencies [to] be governed by 
the same administrative principles that govern other agencies . . . to engage in 
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because “[a] major pitfall of the current transparency architecture 
is that it largely allows agencies to decide what types of 
information should be placed in the public domain.”453 This type of 
intrusion on “reciprocal trust” “implicates the Fourth Amendment 
and is jeopardized when the government is allowed to intrude into 
the citizenry’s lives without a finding that the citizenry has 
forfeited a society’s trust to exercise its freedoms responsibly.”454  
GPS tracking at the border fits well into this context.455 
Currently, an individual implicitly consents to a search both upon 
exiting and returning to the United States.456 He or she has a 
reasonable expectation based on the presence of the border and 
thus acquires notice of an impending search prior to arriving at the 
border.457 Individuals consent to this search because of both 
respect for the sovereign borders of a country and trust that the 
government will not overstep.458 Yet, under “classic” Fourth 
Amendment precedent, individuals have an expectation of privacy 
for their property, and the installation of a GPS tracking device is 
a trespass which violates the Fourth Amendment.459 Combining 
the two doctrines without more leaves citizens in a bind, for it 
alters an individual’s “right to be left alone” while damaging the 
reciprocal trust for the government.460 The opaque policy “alters 
the parameters of evolving subjectivity,” and this shift in balance 
poses problematic consequences if not rectified.461  
 
notice-and-comment rulemaking or a similar democratically oriented process and 
avoid arbitrary and capricious rules”).  
 453.  Shkabatur, Transparency With(out) Accountability, supra note 444, at 
120. 
 454.  See Sundby, Everyone’s Fourth, supra note 432, at 1777 (discussing 
government interests against the trust of citizenry).  
 455.  See Amended Order, supra note 12, at 1–15 (highlighting the problematic 
nature of GPS installation at the border).  
 456.  See Santana, Almeida-Sanchez, supra note 123, at 238 n.149 (noting how 
individuals who leave the borders implicitly consent and are put on notice of a 
search upon their return).  
 457.  See id. (discussing the border crossing and certain justifications for it).  
 458.  See id. (providing justifications over the years for the border search).  
 459.  See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. at 400, 400 (2012) (holding that the 
installation of a GPS device is a search under the Fourth Amendment).  
 460.  See id. (noting that an individual has an expectation of privacy to his or 
her property); see also Cohen, Privacy, supra note 445, at 194 (discussing privacy 
as a concept and what happens to privacy expectations when violated).  
 461.   See Cohen, Privacy, supra note 445, at 194 (mentioning that “[t]he 
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“One of the most frequent objections to greater 
transparency . . . is that doing so would allow criminals to more 
skillfully evade” detection, thus hindering national security 
interests.462 “The need for secrecy [however] is not nearly as acute 
as it may seem.”463 First, a secrecy argument against disclosures of 
regulations regarding deterrence is unnecessary.464 For the entire 
goal of deterrence-based techniques, like administrative 
inspections, “is to use the threat of detection to keep people within 
the lines of law.”465 “[T]here is [accordingly] no plausible rationale 
for shielding department policies regarding the use of these tactics 
from public debate.”466 A similar argument exists at the border. 
GPS tracking aims to deter and detect individuals suspected of 
criminal conduct.467 Without proper notice and disclosure of GPS 
policies at the border,468 an individual lacks the requisite threat of 
detection to remain in the “lines of the law.”469 Deterrence then 
becomes moot in this context.470 However, in regards to more 
sensitive areas of policing, Friedman and Ponomarenko argue that 
“the key distinction is between operational details and governing 
law.”471  
 
effects of exposure and transparency are complementary”). 
 462.  See Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827, 1884 (2015) [hereinafter Friedman & Ponomarenko, 
Democratic Policing] (outlining when secrecy is permissible).  
 463.  Id. 
 464.  See id. (discussing secrecy and deterrence-based techniques).  
 465.  Id.  
 466.  Id.  
 467.  See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 149 (2004) (noting 
how Congress grants executive plenary authority for routine searches at the 
border to not only regulate border duties but to prevent contraband from entering 
into this country); see also United States v. Caicedo-Guarnizo, 723 F.2d 1420, 
1422 (9th Cir. 1984) (highlighting that the validity of a search depends on the 
totality of the circumstances and being reasonably certain that contraband was 
acquired after crossing the border). 
 468.  See discussion supra Part III; see also Allen Declaration, supra note 17, 
at 2–3 (discussing the GPS policy utilized in Ignjatov without disclosing the 
authority behind the policy or when it came into fruition). 
 469.  Friedman & Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, supra note 462, at 1884. 
 470.  See id. (stating that “[s]ecrecy makes the least sense as an argument for 
avoiding regulation when it comes to policing based explicitly on deterrence”). 
 471.  See id. at 1884–85 (distinguishing between deterrence policies and 
sensitive policies).  
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Operational details, such as investigation techniques and 
department protocols, are types of things that do not need to be 
revealed because revealing this information encourages 
circumvention of governmental authority.472 In contrast, governing 
law includes the department’s rules regarding use of these 
techniques, including the level of suspicion required, and can be 
made public without undercutting governmental interests.473 DHS 
and CBP’s forty-eight-hour border policy falls primarily under the 
governing law characterization.474 EFF’s FOIA request sought 
“policies and/or procedures regarding the use of the GPS tracking 
devices on vehicles crossing the border” and “training manuals 
and/or training materials.”475 While procedures could arguably fall 
into “operational details,” policies and training materials fall more 
in line with “governing law” because revealing this information 
merely illustrates the rationale and justification of the agency, 
which bolsters credibility and encourages greater reciprocal trust 
in the governing system.476 Questions remain from the information 
disclosed in Ignjatov. Unlike disclosing information regarding the 
specific “timing of [electronic surveillance technique[s] use[d], and 
the specific location where they were employed,”477 the disclosure 
of policies and/or procedures regarding the use of GPS tracking 
devices on vehicles focuses instead on allowing the public to “make 
informed decisions about policing policy.”478  
FOIA exceptions should apply to “operational details” to 
maintain governmental interests, but in regards to matters of 
governing law, the emphasis similarly should be on allowing the 
 
 472.  See id. at 1885 (differentiating between operational details and 
governing law). 
 473.  See id. (commenting on how governing rules differ from logistics for 
undercover operations).  
 474.  See Allen Declaration, supra note 17, at 2–3 (providing the only known 
specifics to date regarding the policy).  
 475.  EFF Complaint, supra note 1, at 1. 
 476.  See Shkabatur, Transparency With(out) Accountability, supra note 444, 
at 79–80 (describing the benefits of agency transparency on the citizenry).  
 477.  See Lewis-Bey v. United States, 595 F. Supp. 2d 120, 137–38 (D.D.C. 
2009) (protecting and withholding specific undercover investigative techniques).  
 478.  See Friedman & Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, supra note 462, at 
1886–87 (considering how a number of police agencies already make their 
manuals publicly available).  
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public “to make informed decisions about policing policy.”479 By 
allowing a degree of notice and public participation, public 
discourse increases and shifts “the parameters of evolving 
subjectivity,” thereby reshaping the sphere of transparency.480  
Ex post reasoning “would require public officials to explain the 
values and priorities that underlie their decisions,”481 which would 
“require[] participants to move away from positions too obviously 
tailored to their self-interest . . . .”482 Without disclosure, 
“surveillance [in a free society] can have a substantial chilling 
effect on thought, reading habits, and private speech.”483 This 
effect can alter the balance in reciprocal trust and leave 
individuals blindsided.484 A need for transparency is thus 
necessary to efficiently protect privacy interests as technology 
advances, for “[t]rust can add nuance and force to foundational 
privacy concepts such as confidentiality, transparency and security 
by reimagining them as discretion, honesty, and protection.”485 
Policy transparency is thus an integral part in maintaining the 
trust of the citizenry within the system.486 The lack of transparency 
in current GPS border policies will only erode the “balance in 
reciprocal trust and leave individuals blindsided” as they cross the 
border.487 However, policy transparency alone is not enough to 
 
 479.  See Shkabatur, Transparency With(out) Accountability, supra note 444, 
at 121 (commenting on how FOIA exceptions make implementing disclosure of 
information outside of a notice and comment period difficult).  
 480.  See Cohen, Privacy, supra note 445, at 194 (stressing the importance of 
transparency). 
 481.  Id. at 122.  
 482.  Id. at 121.  
 483.  Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy 
Law, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 431, 431–32, 456 (2016) [hereinafter Richards, 
Taking Trust Seriously] (examining the consequences of disregarding trust in 
privacy law).  
 484.  See Cohen, Privacy, supra note 445, at 194 (highlighting the effects of 
exposure and transparency). 
 485.  See Richards, Taking Trust Seriously, supra note 483, at 457 (focusing 
on the detrimental effects of a lack of transparency).  
 486.  See id. (stating that “trust can rejuvenate privacy law and policy”). 
 487.  See discussion supra Sections III.A–B. 
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protect privacy interests.488 Technological changes to the privacy 
status quo also require flexible and adaptable rules in response.489 
While the development of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
may seem drawn-out and sluggish in response to technological 
change, there are a number of benefits to relying on Fourth 
Amendment precedent rather than waiting on legislation.490 
“When the Fourth Amendment covers a particular law 
enforcement activity, it provides a set of rules to regulate it.”491 A 
degree of flexibility exists in Fourth Amendment rules, which 
balances “privacy interests and law enforcement needs.”492 
Furthermore, the Court has made exceptions to the warrant and 
probable cause requirements to “accommodate a wide range of 
government investigative activity within the protective framework 
of the Fourth Amendment.”493  
Professor Kerr argues that “[j]udicial rulemaking is limited by 
strong stare decisis norms that limit the ability of judicial rules to 
change quickly; in contrast, legislatures enjoy wide-ranging 
discretion to enact new rules.”494 While Professor Kerr’s argument 
holds merit to a degree, due to the slow nature of Congressional 
decision-making, “[t]he answer to the problem of creating rules to 
regulate law enforcement and new technologies is not to call for 
judicial caution and leave it to legislatures to draft the primary 
law. Rather, the answer is simply to craft better rules.”495 Courts 
need to be better informed regarding the technology in play, but to 
do so requires a degree of transparency by agencies.496 Without 
 
 488.  See discussion supra Section II.A. 
 489.  See discussion supra Section II.A. 
 490.  Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr’s 
Misguided Call for Judicial Deference, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 761 (2005) 
[hereinafter Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification] (considering Professor 
Kerr’s arguments and finding the judiciary to be better guided in answering to 
the advancements in technology).  
 491.  Id. at 761. 
 492.  See id. at 762 (answering Professor’s Kerr’s article and explaining why 
Congress is not better-suited to respond to growing technological concerns). 
 493.  See id. (arguing that destroying the current framework is unnecessary). 
 494.  Kerr, The Fourth Amendment, supra note 435, at 871. 
 495.  Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification, supra note 490, at 761–73. 
 496.  See Kerr, The Fourth Amendment, supra note 435, at 875 (describing the 
judicial information deficit that can occur as a result of the technological 
complexities).  
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knowing more about the policies in play, such as the details of 
governing law and scope of authority granted to government 
officials, courts lack the ability to determine whether the violation 
is an intrusion on an individual and his property interests or an 
intrusion on an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the Fourth Amendment context.497 
A need for a bridge between existing precedent and 
government transparency exists and can only be brought into 
fruition through compliance on both ends, from ex post reasoning 
to observance and compliance with established precedent.498 While 
some argue that Congress is more capable of handling developing 
regulations regarding privacy and surveillance,499 until Congress 
moves to step in and regulate behavior in response to advancing 
technology, established precedent remains the primary barrier to 
privacy.500 
VI. Conclusion 
The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures,” typically factoring in an 
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy or intrusion on his 
or her property.501 Warrants are therefore necessary in almost all 
 
 497.  See Allen Declaration, supra note 17, at 2–3 (mentioning the GPS border 
policy’s existence without discussing the authority or when it was implemented); 
see also discussions supra Sections II.A, III.B, IV.  
 498. See supra notes 424–496 and accompanying text.  
499. See Kerr, The Fourth Amendment, supra note 435, at 870, 873, 888 
(discussing why legislation is better suited, more expansive, and efficient); see 
also Orin S. Kerr, Congress, The Courts, and New Technologies:  A Response to 
Professor Solove, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 779, 780–81 (2005) (critiquing Professor 
Solove’s approach in allowing the judiciary to handle technological 
advancements).  
 500.  See Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification, supra note 490, at 747–48 
(arguing that the judiciary is fully capable of handling ensuring that Fourth 
Amendment protections remain steadfast in the fact of evolving technologies).  
 501.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 
360–62 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (developing a subjective and objective test 
as to whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy); see also 
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 401, 408–11 (2012) (holding “the Katz 
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test [] added to, not substituted for, the 
common-law trespassory test”).  
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instances for a valid search to occur.502 While the Border Search 
Doctrine is an exception to this rule meant to protect national 
sovereignty and the interests of the state,503 opaque governmental 
measures and incongruities with Fourth Amendment precedent 
highlight the potential decline of privacy interests for citizens and 
non-citizens alike at the border.504 The GPS border policy 
promulgated in United States v. Ignjatov serves merely as one 
example of the growing disparity between the scope of Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence and the Border Search Doctrine on 
privacy interests.505 
A need for greater transparency in enacting policy 
enforcement measures exists in the Fourth Amendment sphere, 
and while some may argue for legislators to step in for the courts, 
courts remain better equipped to develop rules in real-time.506 
However, to ensure transparency, privacy, and trust amongst the 
citizenry both at and near the border, the government and courts 
need to work together rather than apart.507 
 
 
 502. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (majority opinion) (noting that warrantless 
searches are typically unlawful “subject to a few specifically established and 
well-delineated exceptions”).  
 503.  See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616–17 (1977) (highlighting 
border agent rights). 
 504.  See discussion supra Part V. 
 505.  See discussion supra Section III.A. 
 506.  See discussion supra Part V. 
 507.  See discussion supra Part V. 
